Speech
by the High Representative, Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch
to the North Atlantic Council
08 September 1999
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Esteemed Secretary General, Honorable Members of the Council, Ladies and Gentlemen.
It is a great pleasure to be here with you today. I thank you for the invitation to share a few thoughts on Bosnia and Herzegovina at the outset of my mandate- barely three weeks into it, as a matter of fact.
When the North Atlantic Council was born in 1949, the threat it was designed to counter was one of immediate conventional warfare against a single power. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, however, the era of global confrontation is over.
Today the Council is faced with a different range of challenges. Instead of focusing on one conventional threat the NAC must deal with a multitude of unconventional challenges. The first of those challenges - no longer the only one but perhaps still the most difficult - is Bosnia.
The International Community acted in Bosnia for a wide range of reasons -- moral, political and strategic. Our project there was and remains a worthy one. Today, there are many competing claims for resources and attention; in the Balkans alone, Kosovo poses a great challenge.
Nonetheless, if we cannot make a success of our presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I doubt we can make the Stability Pact initiative work. Bosnia is at the heart of the Balkans geographically, but more important yet it is the heart of the Balkans' volatile mix of nationalism, post-communist economic malaise, and ethnic rivalry. Just as the wars of 1991-1995 were not foreordained, our success or failure in Bosnia is not set in stone. We have had good success in the physical reconstruction of Bosnia; now we must concentrate on the very difficult task of the basic reform of its institutions and economic structures.
Mr Secretary General, let us look where we stand in this project to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina into the democratic community of nations. After only a few weeks - but much thought - I have formed several fundamental impressions.
- We should not assume and not create the impression that we intend to stay in Bosnia forever.
- Therefore, we should not plan for open-ended commitments that leave us muddling through from daily crisis to daily crisis.
- We need now to examine carefully critical areas of concern that, if addressed with success, can send us home and Bosnia into the Euro-Atlantic community.
- In sum, I do not intend to simply become the third of a long line of High Representatives who will govern Bosnia for a generation or more. We must define and achieve an end state, not fix an end date.
Under my administration, OHR will proceed along precisely these strategic lines. We have, fortunately, inherited some progress on the ground.
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- Dayton crafted and IFOR enforced an end to the hell of ethnic warfare. As we weave our way through the problems of today we must never forget what we owe to those in the International Community and in NATO who put an end to the nightmare years.
- No doubt some of you sitting before me took part in those efforts; and I thank you for them.
- The sad lesson of history is that few populations exiled by war and hatred ever return to their homelands. Bosnia can be an exception. Refugees are returning - albeit in insufficient numbers and at an uneven pace - but returning they are.
- Dayton establishes this possibility; SFOR secures it; OHR and UNHCR carry it out.
- Politically, common institutions are forming; freedom of movement has been established and respected; a common currency has been put in place and circulates widely.
- Media reform is underway, and partisan broadcasting is gradually on the wane.
But we cannot do everything. While we must act with firmness and leadership in Bosnia, it is a mistake to believe that the International Community - whether civilian or military - can resolve every dispute over every issue in every village in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I hope OHR can step back, take a good look at what needs to be done, and pare down our focus to a handful of key strategic concerns.
For example, on the political front we need to:
- Work hard on the Common Institutions and basic political framework that will make Bosnia a state. We need to help Bosnia create the political institutions that allow a multi-ethnic society to function and eventually thrive. In the next year, elections will play a large role in this, and we must ensure that the voices of tolerance are heard.
- Of course, there is strong resistance to this as well. Entrenched and powerful nationalist parties take a minimalist view of Dayton. Their commitment to a multi-ethnic sovereign state is paper-thin and composed largely of empty rhetoric. I have zero tolerance for extremism.
- In this atmosphere we must cajole, persuade and, occasionally, dictate. We need to encourage reform-parties that are not wedded to the politics of exclusion. Indeed, we can and should show active support for political forces that reach out to the other two constituent peoples.
- We also need to analyze what the current local, regional and international scene can offer us. Internationally, the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo brought a new focus to the Balkans as a region. Bosnia is at the heart of the regional problem, and I welcome a coordinated regional approach.
- Indeed, regionally we may be witnessing the swan song of the Milosevic regime and the dreams of a "Greater Serbia" born out of force and fraud. Similarly, regional forces that were willing to sacrifice Bosnia for a "Greater Croatia" are also on the wane.
- In a regional and international approach, capitals with influence in Zagreb must use that pressure point.
- We should continue the hard work on returns of displaced persons and refugees.
- We especially need to respond to spontaneous returns; this is so very difficult because all bureaucracies are so very cumbersome. Somehow, we must streamline a response to this. This issue goes to the heart of Dayton - the development of a truly multi-ethnic state.
On the economic front, there are also a handful of critical tasks ahead. In a nutshell:
- Economic reform needs to be fostered; corruption needs to be fought.
- We must work with great energy in helping Bosnia dismantle the remnants of a command economy further distorted by a half-decade of war. A strong economy is a disincentive for renewed violence and separatism, just as it is an incentive for returns. Privatization alone is not enough; foreign investment, export markets and a strong banking system are all essential.
- Most important: We need to uproot the culture of corruption that has embedded itself in the ruins of war and the collapse of communism.
- Reactivating the economy, carrying out the necessary judicial reform, fighting corruption, and establishing transparency in government and business are obviously closely linked to one another. Progress in one of these individual areas is a necessary but not sufficient basis for turning Bosnia's economy around. We need to review with the International Community how we can achieve progress in all of them, in a coordinated and pointed approach. We are prepared to take the lead.
- The Madrid PIC of December 1998 has given us guidance and a mandate; we will follow it.
On the security front:
- The ideal of a single army remains unacceptable in most of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the international community will have to work with this reality for the foreseeable future.
- Therefore, the Standing Committee for Military Matter (SCMM) is the key institution for future security, but it has to function properly. We are getting there, but through its secretariat, it must now be made to work well and its scope must be increased.
- We need to see cuts in the force structure of the Entity Armed Forces, not just spending reductions. And the current work to reduce the Entity Armed Forces by 15% must be seen as just the first step. The good news is that this very day the Presidency is meeting to approve these reduction, and the SCMM is meeting to decide on how to implement it.
- Mr Secretary General, let us continue to work on the professionalization of the armed forces in Bosnia.
- War criminals. They are out there. They need to be brought to justice. I thank the SFOR contingents of individual nations for what they have done to date; I encourage all to do more. The arrest of Mr. Karadzic is particularly important. The rather mute response in the RS to the arrest of General Talic is a good sign.
I have spoken much about what we need to do. I would stress that we cannot do it alone - not the OHR, not SFOR, not the OSCE, UN or individual capitals. We need our local partners in Bosnia to act as if they too really believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina's future lies in the heart of Europe, and not on an isolated fringe. In the end, the Bosnians themselves - not the IC -- have ownership of the process that can lead them into Europe.
Membership in the international community of democracies, in European and international institutions, implies that standards must be met. I would argue that in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina these standards - for example, on accession to the Council of Europe - should be enforced with rigor. We hurt our own cause - and more important, the cause of Bosnia and Herzegovina - if we pretend we have reached benchmarks that we in fact have not met.
Finally, let me thank you for the magnificent job SFOR has done on the security front. Good planning, effective forces, and excellent leadership were needed and provided. SFOR presence has been a key to stability and has provided us the security environment we need. What is needed to maintain that environment is a decision for you and your military advisors. For my part, I will work to reduce the possibilities of conflict, which, if successful, can also help create a stable environment. Not only have I had valuable meetings with Sec Gen Javier Solana and Gen Wesley Clark; my frequent contacts with Com SFOR General Montgomery Meigs in Sarajevo have already proved crucial to our common success. I look forward to maintaining close contact with any and all of his successors.
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr Secretary General, there is much to be done. And I very much look forward to getting it done with you.
Thank you again for the invitation, and for your kind attention.
Speech by Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative
08 September 1999
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