1. It is just two years since the guns fell silent over Bosnia; two years since the international community extinguished the flames of the most brutal war in Europe for almost half a century.

2. Our purpose here today is to take stock of what we have achieved in the last twenty four months, especially in recent months; to agree on our strategy in the months ahead; and to pledge decisive action to carry it out.

3. There have, inevitably, been many areas where progress has not been as rapid as we would all have liked. I shall come to those in a moment.

   
   The progress so far.

4. But before I do so, let me say something about what has been achieved.

   • First and most important, Bosnia remains at peace. The guns are silent. The armies are under control. Every day that passes is one more day without war, one more day without bloodshed, one more day without new lives being wrecked and families torn asunder.

   • Normal life is, slowly, returning to Bosnia. Sarajevo is steadily recovering the status and feel of a thriving community. Two years ago the city resounded to shells and gunfire. Now it rocks to the beat of U2.

   • There are growing transport links both within the country and with the outside world. Last week the buses started to run again between Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

   • International airlines now fly in and out of Sarajevo. Banja Luka airport has just re-opened. It will, I hope, be followed soon by Mostar and Tuzla.

   • Border crossings across the Una and Sava rivers to Croatia were re-opened in September.

5. Building on the inheritance from my predecessor, Carl Bildt, we have intensified our efforts in the last six months. A new, reinforced commitment by the international community has allowed us to bring real progress to peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

   • In the field of security, special police (armed paramilitary militias) have been classified as armed forces by SFOR and are now subject to the strict controls contained in Annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement.

   • Almost 6,600 heavy weapons have been neutralised by the parties in compliance with the arms control provisions of the Peace Agreement. Most have been physically destroyed.

   • The Standing Committee for Military Matters has been established and is helping to build desperately needed trust between the former warring armies.

   • Bosnia is becoming, slowly, a more democratic place. Municipal and RS assembly elections have been held within the last three months. They have taken place peacefully and in an orderly manner, under the guidance of Ambassador Frowick and his team from the OSCE. The turnout - at between 70 and 85% - would have done credit to most Western democracies. And the latest results show some loosening of the grip of hardline parties.

   • A major cause of the war in Bosnia was irresponsible, nationalist media. The persistence of this approach led me to take firm action in October, in accordance with the Sintra Declaration and supported by SFOR, to suspend media outlets which consistently flouted standards of professionalism and pluralism. I am currently working out new media regulations for the whole of Bosnia designed to break single party control in each entity over radio and television.

   • Police restructuring and integration are accelerating in the Federation. Agreements were recently signed to begin restructuring in the Republika Srpska. Large quantities of illegal weaponry have been confiscated by the United Nations International Police Task Force and SFOR in both Entities. Furthermore, both have implemented stringently a ban on illegal checkpoints. Freedom of movement has dramatically improved.

   • Returns of refugees and displaced persons continue and the number of communities allowing ethnic minority returns is growing. Authorities in the Central Bosnia Canton recently agreed on a joint plan for returns, encouraging initially Croats and Bosniaks to return to their homes of origin and to cross ethnic fault lines preventing their return.

   The economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is growing stronger. Industrial production and GDP in the Federation have risen dramatically, along with wages, while unemployment has fallen sharply. The start of economic recovery in the Republika Srpska should be greatly facilitated by improved political stability and a firmer engagement of the Entity's authorities in the peace process following the recent National Assembly elections.

6. After four years of war, we have achieved a great deal in just two years of peace. None of this would have been possible without the dedicated work of the international community in Bosnia.

7. I would like to extend my thanks:

   • to the commanders and soldiers of SFOR, drawn from 36 nations around the world, who have carried forward the work of IFOR with great skill;

   • to the OSCE, who have supervised three sets of some of the most complicated elections in the world with great professionalism;

   • to the UN, IPTF, UNHCR, ECMM and to the other international organisations and non-governmental organisations and all their staff.

8. All work with great commitment and dedication, many of them far from their homes, in difficult, sometimes dangerous conditions.

9. I should like to pay a special tribute to the twelve men and women who died in the helicopter accident of 17 September. They included five from my office, among them my able Deputy and dear friend Gerd Wagner.

10. Their sacrifice reminds us of the seriousness of the task we are about.

    
    The challenges

11. What war destroys in the blink of an eye, peace takes years, decades even, to repair. I am more keenly aware than most of the great gap which sometimes exists between expectations abroad and hard reality on the ground in Bosnia. We must remember that in addition to repairing the damage of war, Bosnia , like its neighbours, is also coming to terms with life after Communism, with all the difficult adjustments in thinking and outlook that that entails. So we must be careful not to demand of Bosnia feats which we never expected of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe whose problems, relatively speaking, were rather less onerous. Their transition towards democracy and the market economy was not, as it was in Bosnia, brutally interrupted by war.

12. Having said that, however, you would expect me to be candid with you, and I shall be. The fact remains that despite the advances we have made, in many, many areas the peace process is now seriously blocked. Let me put it another way: it is precisely because we are moving ahead, that we are encountering new obstacles in our way. Those who, more or less openly, cherish secession or reunification with neighbouring countries try to obstruct, delay or minimize the process of building the common institutions. In an opposite direction work those who, nostalgic for the pre-war situation, refuse to accept the new realities brought up by Dayton and desperately cling to the old structures they dominate. Both are equally wrong. Both are equally dangerous to the peace process. The more we press on, the more they dig in their heals. But our obligation and our determination is to stick firmly to Dayton. There is no valid alternative.

13. The task we face is huge. Two years after the war, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina still has:

    • no permanently located, properly functioning common institutions;

    • no new flag;

    • no common licence plate;

    • no common passport;

    • no currency of its own;

    • no legal definition of citizenship;

    • no law adopted on foreign investment;

    • no adopted permanent laws on a customs code and customs tariffs;

    • no full definition or adequate protection of human rights;

    • no strong, multi-ethnic, country-wide political parties, and no structured civil society. Extremist leaders, although their influence is declining, continue to intimidate the population, to sow discord, and to frustrate economic and political reconstruction;

    • Bosnia has no established public corporations; in particular, the Transportation Corporation, which covers railroads, is not operating.

14. In addition, property laws block the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes. The police continue, by and large, to fall far below even basic standards of professional conduct. Human rights violations remain endemic, despite improvements in some areas.

15. Corruption and revenue evasion remain a serious problem. I believe that the Bosnian people are entitled to much greater transparency and accountability throughout their government, and I have announced proposals to promote this.

16. Bosnia and Herzegovina is still unable to finance its common institutions or service its external debt on time, implement common policies on foreign trade, issue common banknotes, achieve transparency and good governance in the use of public funds, establish effective institutions to curb corruption, and dissolve or integrate pre/Peace Agreement institutions. The lack of an economic policy framework is preventing an IMF Standby agreement and World Bank adjustment lending and renders the country vulnerable to financial crisis.

17. Last but not least, far too many war crimes indictees still remain at large. I welcome the fact that the total number brought before the Court is now 20, most of whom have been delivered to The Hague since April. But let us be clear: there can be no lasting peace with freedom and justice in Bosnia while so many war crimes indictees remain at liberty. In particular, Radovan Karadzic, whose malign influence contaminates the entire social, political and economic atmosphere in the country.

    
    The way ahead

18. A formidable amount of work remains ahead of us. It is clear that the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement will require a long-term effort by the international community in Bosnia. We must think not in terms of exit strategies, but of long-term engagement, with gradual disengagement as improving circumstances allow. The faster the progress, the sooner we will be able to leave matters in the hands of the people of Bosnia and those they elect, in free and fair elections, to lead and to represent them.

19. The overriding requirement, before we can even contemplate how to tackle the remaining challenges, is to preserve the stable and secure environment in which peace can grow. This means that an international military presence in Bosnia beyond next June 1998 is in my view indispensable. Without it, we risk the return to war, the ruin of all that has been achieved so far and the unleashing of a new cycle of horror and bloodshed. So I welcome the emerging consensus for a military presence to continue beyond next summer. Plainly it is for you, the nations which contribute to SFOR, to determine the size of any such force. But I appeal to you to ensure that it should be readily available and effective enough to respond to events on the ground.

20. I am determined that we should make more rapid progress in the coming months in rebuilding civil society in Bosnia. At Sintra in May, the Steering Board adopted a more assertive approach. The High Representative was charged to pursue deadlines for outstanding decisions, and to take and to recommend measures in the case of non-compliance.

21. I believe that this course has proved to be right. But the time has passed to rely solely on appeals to the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to live up to their commitments under the Peace Agreement. Too often, declarations of willingness and good faith have proved to be of face value only.

    
    The role of the High Representative

22. We need to act - quickly and firmly - to clear away the most serious obstacles to further progress within Bosnia on the issues I have set out. The task ahead of us is paramount. And our time is limited. We must not lose time. We shall never be as strong in Bosnia as we are today. Never again will we have the support in such large measure of our peoples. Let us take advantage of both that strength and support to use the coming months to complete the bulk of our job.

23. Let there be no misunderstanding. I am not seeking from this Council a new or revised mandate. Not yet. But what I will need from you is your full support in the more vigorous exercise of my existing mandate in order to clear the boulders strewn across our path.

24. I intend to exercise to the full the final authority in theatre, given to me under Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement, to break the log-jam in a number of key areas where other approaches have been exhausted.

25. I intend to do this, for example, by resorting to decisions on the following issues:

    • timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common institutions;

    • interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision on the issue concerned, consistent with the Peace Agreement;

    • measures to suspend enforcement of legislation which does not comply with the Peace Agreement;

    • other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may include dismissal from office of officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or persistently block the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

26. I reserve the right to return to the Steering Board to recommend further action should the parties fail to comply with any of these decisions.

27. It goes without saying that all these efforts, and the requirements which the international community places upon me, require adequate resources if they are to succeed. I appeal to this Council, in determining the work it wishes to see carried out by the High Representative and his staff, to take full account of this point. It is especially important that member countries should meet promptly and in full their obligations to meet the budget of my Office. We need good people to be seconded to us. But we also need funding to employ staff with the necessary skills and to provide the facilities they need in order to perform effectively.

    
    Conclusion

28. Mr. Chairman, it is perhaps inevitable that at this stage in the implementation of Dayton, there should be those who say it is time for us to abandon our work, to abandon Bosnia and its people to their fate. There are those who talk grandly and from afar of partitioning the country, of dividing it into ethnic enclaves and departing. They seem to believe that such an approach would allow NATO and the international community to escape with its prestige and honour intact.

29. I have to say that I have neither the time nor the appetite for such defeatist talk. And I say that with especial emphasis in this room, where so many nationalities are represented who have learned to put their differences aside and to work together for peace. The international community would pay a high price in terms of lost credibility if it abrogated its responsibilities in the way some are suggesting it should. But many Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs could pay with their lives. A new war would begin every bit as bloody as the one we came to stop; and no sooner had we withdrawn than the calls for us to return would begin, with new costs, both human and financial. Partitioning the country would mean conniving at the horrors of ethnic cleansing, and would send a disastrous signal to extremists elsewhere in the region and the world.

30. And honour? Where would the honour lie in all of that?

31. The hard truth is that we have to see through the task we have begun. The stakes are high. For Europe, and its institutions. For the future of NATO. For the international community, and its capacity to respond to such crises in the future.

32. But the stakes are higher for no one than the peoples of Bosnia themselves, who look forward to a future without war, to a return to a normal, peaceful existence for their families and their children.

33. We owe it to them, and to ourselves, to see this job through. With your help and support, you may count upon my determination to do so.

---

OHR Speech of the High Representative
21 August 1997