C. POLICY REQUIREMENTS
- External assistance alone will not be enough to ensure the sustainable economic reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. In the absence of institutional reforms, donor assistance is likely to have limited impact, and both Entity Governments should be strongly encouraged to immediately start addressing some of the main issues which fall under their responsibility (and do not require substantial financial assistance to be resolved), including:
- Promoting the implementation of a legislative and regulatory framework conducive to growth and private sector development.
Bosnia and Herzegovina still faces many of the challenges of transition economies. Donor assistance will achieve very few sustainable effects if it is not strongly backed up and eventually substituted by private sector involvement.
- In the short-term, steps should be taken to further reduce payroll taxes (including social taxes), currently at about 50 percent of gross salary, vs. 18 percent for OECD countries and 30 percent for Central and Eastern Europe, and to rapidly privatize public enterprises.
- In a second phase, a number of other key reforms should be undertaken, including: setting up an effective legal framework for private sector activities (e.g., property rights, contract laws, commercial law, bankruptcy law, etc.); liberalizing the economic system and policies, including labor market reforms; implementing reform of the payment bureaus; developing measures to attract foreign investors; and reforming the financial sector.
- Establishing an anti-discrimination legal and administrative infrastructure, to prevent discrimination against returnees, relocatees and displaced persons in the employment market.
The Sarajevo Return Conference, held on February 3, 1998, under the joint chairmanship of the US, the EU and the OHR, outlined an agenda for preventing discrimination. It called specifically for the establishment of a Cantonal Return and Employment Commission to "set up rules, policies and procedures to address discrimination in the workplace and disseminate the information widely to the public and develop an anti-discrimination code of employment practices and promote its adoption by local public and private enterprises" Similar efforts should be undertaken throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina:
- In the short-term, Cantonal (in the Federation) and Regional (in Republika Srpska) Employment and Return Commissions should be established throughout the country, with mandates similar to that of the Sarajevo Return Commission; emphasis should be put on defining effective implementation mechanisms for the Commissions' decisions.
- In a second phase, a set of anti-discrimination laws should be passed and enforced to guarantee fair labor standards of employment, fair work environment (no harassment), fair banking principles (credit allocation based on economic criteria only), and fair access to vital information (e.g., employment records, etc.).
- In the medium-term an effort should also be made to: reform the labor market and to increase its efficiency, reform the education system (especially by developing vocational training suited to economic needs), and address key policy issues in each sector.
D. INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS
- Assuming that the regulatory environment is appropriate, donors should also aim to maximize the impact of their assistance. In particular, donors should try to leverage private savings and reserve scarce grant resources for those who most need them. In most areas, programs have already been initiated. Whenever possible, existing instruments should be used or adjusted, rather than new projects developed (which is both time- and resource-consuming). Financial assistance is needed in support of a five-pillar program:
- Provision of Critical Inputs (US$34 million)
Critical inputs are necessary in many cases to restart economic activities: seeds, farm equipment or livestock for farmers, raw materials or small equipment for factories, etc. Such assistance should be provided on a credit basis, with soft loans or grants reserved for the most vulnerable. An effort should be made to develop transparent allocation mechanisms, adequately targeted with a bias in favor of returnees and displaced persons (and to avoid supporting enterprises involved in organized relocation of displaced persons aimed at preventing returns of pre-war inhabitants). Focus should be on activities that can become sustainable over the medium-term (hence the preference for credit or soft loans). Effective mechanisms have already been designed and used for similar projects (e.g., for providing agricultural inputs, livestock and farm equipment) and could be usefully used once again to channel donor resources to priority areas where large population movements are taking place.
- Support for Private Sector Development (US$52 million):
A number of financial instruments have already been developed to support private sector involvement: micro-credit, lines of credit, start-up grants (see Box 9), guarantees for foreign investors, equity funds, etc. Guidelines for effective use of donor contributions have been set by the Industry Task Force. Efforts should include:
BOX 9: EC-FUNDED START-UP GRANTS FOR SUSTAINABLE EMPLOYMENT
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Over the past two years, the EC has successfully contributed to the (re)start of local enterprises by financing labor costs (on a grant basis) for part of the staff for time periods of less than six months.
The program is implemented through the "Mission Locale de Strasbourg" (MLS). The MLS is responsible for, inter alia, selecting beneficiaries (with a potential for sustainability beyond the start-up period), ensuring that staff is effectively employed directly by the company in case of success, and paying wages directly to workers (at 100 DEM a month).
About 75 percent of the staff initially financed by the EC is now regularly employed by the beneficiary companies and more than 2,700 sustainable jobs have been created at an average cost of about US$800 per job (including project management).
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- Providing continued support to existing operations, particularly lines of credit and micro-credit projects. Success for such operations is essentially linked to the setting up of effective institutions, with a view to developing financial self-sustainability. Donors should focus their efforts on gradually strengthening existing credit institutions rather than on multiplying ad hoc projects (see Map 8 on existing micro-credit projects).
- Filling the existing gaps in terms of lending instruments, both geographically and in terms of lending conditions (loan size and duration). Effort should be made to extend progressively the coverage of credit institutions throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, new instruments should be developed, especially to provide credit for small enterprises (in amounts between US$10,000 and US$50,000), medium enterprises (in amounts between about US$170,000 and US$570,000), and for agricultural activities.
- Encouraging returnees, and particularly minority returnees, to "come back with a job ". Regardless of efforts made by the international community, minority returnees are likely to be subject to discrimination at least during an initial phase. Attempts should be made to encourage them to develop activities that could generate an income once they have returned (possibly through specifically targeted micro-credit or training schemes, with a focus on "movable" activities). Specific programs could be further developed in Western host countries to that effect.
- Short-term Employment Generation (US$22 million)
It will take years for private sector activities to develop to the level required to generate a sufficient number of jobs, particularly in areas where destruction has been severe. To avoid impeding population movements and stabilizing unnecessarily people in their current places of residence, efforts have to be made to provide short-term employment. Different schemes are already in place (public works, subsidized employment, income-generating projects) and could be expanded upon or replicated. Since these schemes are relatively expensive (about US$350 per person-per month for short-term non-sustainable jobs), they should be carefully targeted to areas where they may have the highest impact, politically as well as economically. This would include:
- Financing public works or subsidized employment in municipalities which have demonstrated their readiness to comply with Dayton Peace Agreement provisions (e.g., "Open Cities"). Continued emphasis should, however, be placed on developing demand-driven mechanisms for selecting public work projects, in order to ensure that resources are directed in response to locally-identified priority needs. Subsidized employment should also be limited to activities with potential for financial self-sustainability beyond the start-up period.
- Generating temporary employment in areas of return for a several-month transition period until regular income can replace aid (e.g., to support rural returnees during the few months necessary to restart agricultural activities). Focus should be on income-generation projects, and possibly on public works. Priority should be given to areas in which both large returns have taken place and sustainable activities can be developed during the transition period.
- Support for Economic Transition (12 million)
Transition to a market economy and restructuring of economic activities as a consequence of the breakdown of the internal Yugoslav market are resulting in significant changes on the labor market. Returnees and displaced persons are likely to be among those most affected by these changes, and should not be marginalized in the adjustment process. Efforts should be three-fold:
- Support services should be developed for both farmers and small businesses in areas of return to help increase productivity and strengthen efficiency. Support required includes: reequipping veterinary institutes, setting up agricultural extension service network, reviving forestry institutes, and also establishing business centers, and providing training to respond to companies' needs.
- Employment and job-finding services should be supported. These services are essential to returnees and displaced persons, who do not have access to efficient social networks, for obtaining information on job vacancies.
- Training (and retraining) should be provided to refugees, displaced persons and returnees, to upgrade their skills and to facilitate their satisfactory reintegration in the labor market. About 60 percent of unemployed displaced persons are looking for jobs which do not require specific qualifications or skills. Learning new skills or obtaining additional qualifications are critical for finding employment opportunities. Training programs could be implemented not only in areas of return, but also in areas of displacement or in countries of asylum (as already undertaken by some of these countries), to best prepare an eventual return.
- Technical assistance (US$5 million)
For satisfactory implementation of the assistance program, technical assistance is necessary, especially for:
- Project preparation and supervision . These costs should be kept to a minimum by involving local authorities, whenever possible, in the design and implementation of assistance programs.
- Assistance to authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the preparation of necessary policy measures and in their successful implementation.
- Monitoring of adhesion to anti-discrimination procedures, possibly through local human rights organizations, to report on irregularities, mediate whenever possible and provide legal assistance to individuals as required.
C.3. Housing
A. BACKGROUND
BOX 10: THE HOUSING SITUATION IN 1991 |
Pre-war accommodation standards in Bosnia and Herzegovina were relatively high:
- about 1,295,000 housing units for 4.4 million people;
- a relatively high-quality housing stock, half of which was built after 1971;
- adequate residential infrastructure coverage in urban areas (although services lagged behind in unplanned and privately developed suburbs).
The housing stock was:
- 80 percent privately-owned, mainly in the countryside (owner-built family houses);
- 20 percent was "socially-owned" (i.e. by public companies), mainly in the cities, where public housing (multi-family blocks of rental apartments) accounted for about half of the stock; tenure bestowed many of the benefits of full ownership.
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- Availability of adequate housing space is key to the successful reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. Many possible movements are currently hindered by housing-related difficulties. Current housing shortages for returnees stems from three main factors:
- The pre-war housing stock (see Box 10) suffered considerable damage during the war. Damage to the stock was not, however, evenly distributed throughout the country - and the overall population has substantially decreased. Housing shortages vary significantly among the regions, and within each region between municipalities and rural or urban communities. In specific places, and for certain categories of beneficiaries (especially the most vulnerable), there is a shortage of accommodation. Such situations are, however, relatively limited and may not be the main impediment to providing returnees and displaced persons with suitable accommodation.
- Almost everywhere throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, many houses of people who left during the war (and particularly those belonging to ethnic minorities) are currently used to host displaced persons. Refugees and displaced persons often cannot return to their homes without evicting others - which is almost impossible in the absence of satisfactory alternative solution for occupants. In principle, this is primarily a logistical problem: movements should be synchronized, with some sort of temporary accommodation provided where needed. But many "temporary" occupants have no intention of returning to their place of origin (for political, economic or personal reasons), particularly among rural people currently accommodated in cities. Reconstructing villages of origin has proven both costly and relatively ineffective in motivating such people to return: even once their homes are repaired, they tend to stay in town. Assisting them in settling in the urban environment where they currently live may be the only solution to enable the pre-war owners to return.
- A number of families control several housing units (often theirs and one or several occupied ones): split households, extension of pre-war housing space, returns to villages while keeping a housing unit in the city, etc. A recent UNHCR survey shows that Sarajevo could host an additional 40,000 returnees (i.e. the bulk of the expected returns) with no deterioration in the housing situation (as measured by number of persons per unit) compared to pre-war levels. Preliminary analysis indicates that a similar situation might exist in several other regions. Improving allocation and management of the existing housing space (with decentralized, incentive-based mechanisms) may be more important to support reintegration (and much less expensive) than constructing new housing units.
- Addressing the housing issue will also require resolving ownership issues. Many refugees and displaced persons have de facto been deprived of their property or tenure (in case of socially-owned dwellings) rights. Property rights should in principle revert to the owners upon reclaim, but in both Entities the rights of the new occupant often take precedence over those of the original occupant.
B. OBJECTIVES AND FINANCING REQUIREMENTS
- Within the framework of the overall reconstruction program presented in December 1995 by the EC and the World Bank, specific actions should be undertaken in the housing sector to facilitate the reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. Assistance to the sector should aim to ensure satisfactory accommodation for returnees and displaced persons while respecting property rights. Since housing repairs are expensive (the average reconstruction cost is between US$15,000 and US$25,000 per unit), only a small percentage of potential returnees can benefit from grant assistance. The assistance program should therefore be based on a three-fold approach:
- Support for the restoration of property rights as per the procedures agreed to in the Dayton Peace Agreement;
- Promote the development of efficient market mechanisms: most returnees and displaced persons will not benefit from direct grant assistance, and will be able to resolve their current difficulties only through such mechanisms this will require:
- amending existing regulations to liberalize the housing market and ensure better matching between supply and demand (including improving existing space allocation); and
- developing adequate mechanisms for leveraging private financing for housing works (and for mobilizing private savings within the country); and
- Help address issues which cannot be resolved through market mechanisms, especially accommodation for the most vulnerable through grants extended on the basis of an agreed and transparent list of criteria (which may include social as well as more political considerations).
- Since the start of the reconstruction program, the donor community has committed about US$450 million for housing projects, which has had very significant impact on the ground. In 1998, an additional US$125 million will be needed for reintegration-oriented activities in the housing sector (see Table 6).
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