

Summary of the Report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on a Possible EU Deployment in BiH Presented to the EU Council of Foreign Ministers

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INTRODUCTION

The European Council of 12 December 2003 confirmed the EU's readiness for an ESDP mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina including a military component. NATO is currently considering the future of SFOR. In the event that it should decide to end SFOR's mission, the EU should be prepared to deploy a force to BiH.

In providing a force for BiH the EU's principal objective would be to contribute to Bosnia's aspiration to achieve full integration into the EU and NATO.

An EU deployment would be part of a comprehensive approach bringing together political, economic and security dimensions. This report focuses mainly on the security element.

I. A NEW AND DISTINCT MISSION

The completion of SFOR's mission will leave BiH in a very different position from that when NATO first deployed in 1995. The objectives, size and composition of an EU force should reflect the new situation.

Such a mission should meet two fundamental objectives:

§ It should guarantee the secure environment required for the core objectives in OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and should contribute directly to them.

§ It should have a particular focus on the fight against organised crime.

II. A SECURE ENVIRONMENT

An EU force should be configured to assume the military responsibilities of the Dayton Agreement and to contribute to the political objective of a stable, democratic and prosperous BiH. This force would be the ultimate guarantor of the High Representative's authority under Dayton. It should have full legal authority (including that contained in Annex IA of the Dayton Agreement) to assist in implementing the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

– An EU Force should be credible and robust, acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter. It should be able to address any threats to a secure and stable environment in BiH.

– Over time the composition of the force would be adjusted. To be effective a force on this scale would need good intelligence, flexible and integrated capabilities, and a call on an over the horizon reserve.

III. A FOCUS ON ORGANISED CRIME

A major obstacle to further stabilisation in BiH is the nexus of organised crime and political extremism. Establishing the rule of law and dealing with organised criminal networks are the key to long-term stability in BiH. The EU is already involved in these areas through the CARDS programme and EUPM.

The eventual aim is a BiH that can tackle organised crime on its own. Institutions to do this – the State Information and Protection Agency and the Bosnian police forces are being built and strengthened; but many problems remain. Until this work is complete, international reinforcement will be needed.

IV. AN INTEGRATED EU APPROACH

One of the keys to achieving the EU's political objectives will be the coherent use of the different EU capabilities in BiH. Coherence can best be achieved by cooperation and leadership on the ground. At the centre of this should be a reinforced co-ordinating role for the EUSR. He needs to be able to function as *primus inter pares* among the heads of the different EU missions in BiH. In particular the EUSR should ensure complementarity between the implementation of the Dayton/Paris provisions and progress in the Stabilisation and Association Process.

V. CLOSE COOPERATION WITH NATO

The International Community has been effective in dealing with the problems of the Balkans when it has acted together. It is vital for the success of any EU operations in BiH that the EU should work in the closest possible cooperation with NATO and with the United States. Both practical and policy considerations point to an EU force taking advantage of NATO capabilities through the Berlin Plus arrangements.

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Lessons learned in Operation Concordia should be incorporated into planning for an EU-led force and in the Berlin Plus arrangements.

VI. CONSULTATIONS WITH BIH AUTHORITIES

EU officials, together with NATO counterparts, have already made contact with BiH authorities. Close EU/BiH consultation should continue.