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Report to the United Nations Security
Council
1 July 2006 - 31 March 2007
SUMMARY
The general election
campaign and the subsequent negotiations to form new governments at the state,
entity and cantonal levels dominated the second half of 2006 and the first
quarter of 2007 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Although I continued to
encourage and support the domestic authorities in their efforts to adopt and
implement the reforms required if BiH is to make further progress towards
Euro-Atlantic integration, both the intense pre-election environment and the
complicated post-election situation were far from conducive to success. By
year’s end, only Republika Srpska (RS) had a reconstructed government. The
state-level Council of Ministers was formed in February, and a Federation
government was finally established only on 30 March. At the end of March,
six months after the elections, three of the ten cantons remained without new
governments.
1. The highly divisive and occasionally inflammatory rhetoric that
characterised the election campaign put my resolve to promote domestic ownership
to the test; but it also made it possible to make a realistic assessment of the
extent to which the domestic political establishments could take on
ever-increasing responsibility for their own country’s affairs. Only by
establishing the reality of the situation in BiH did it prove possible to
identify the mechanisms that will be required in future to assist this country
in completing its transition from post-communist and post-war fragility to
Euro-Atlantic integration and security.
2. Despite repeated calls during and after the election campaign for a
referendum on Republika Srpska independence – and countervailing demands from
the Federation to abolish that entity – these first general elections since the
war to be wholly organised and run by the domestic authorities passed off
peacefully and successfully on 1 October. On the other hand, the parties
that employed the most vociferous rhetoric during the campaign were also the
biggest winners: the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) of RS Prime
Minister Milorad Dodik and the Party for BiH (SBiH) of newly elected Presidency
member Haris Silajdzic. The electoral arithmetic meant, however, that
these two parties, regardless of their opposite stands on numerous issues, were
compelled to share power at state level, in the Federation and in some
cantons.
3. The other notable result of the elections was the weakening of
the traditional nationalist parties that had dominated the political scene in
BiH since the first free elections in 1990: the (Bosniak) Party for Democratic
Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croat Democratic Union
(HDZ BiH). Their loss of predominance among their respective electorates
does not signal, however, any diminution in the salience of national (and
nationalistic) issues.
4. Little progress was made during the period in meeting the
preconditions for signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with
the European Union. The technical negotiations with the European
Commission (EC) were completed successfully, with very good performances on the
BiH side by both the chief negotiator and the Directorate for European
Integration. However, the failure to forge a political agreement on police
restructuring precluded the initialling of an SAA during the period.
5. Constitutional reform remained a high-profile issue, although there
has been no concrete progress on constitutional reform during the last six
months, primarily due to the focus of the local authorities on government
formation and police reform. The package of amendments narrowly defeated in the
BiH Parliament in April 2006 remains on the table. However, it appears
increasingly unlikely that the package will get the necessary support to be
reintroduced and adopted, despite clear and repeated calls for this by the PIC
Steering Board. Recent political developments have confirmed constitutional
reform as imperative for BiH for both political and functional reasons. The
debate on BiH constitutional problems and the need for reform continue to
consume much political and public space. BiH political
leaders have recently started to promote some ideas on
possible constitutional set ups. The 26 February ruling by the International
Court of Justice on the suit launched by the former Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1993 has
brought the issue to the fore once more. Bosniak politicians, led by Haris
Silajdzic, have seized upon the court’s verdict and have pointed out that it was
the army and police of the wartime RS that committed genocide in and around
Srebrenica in July 1995. They demand both that the Srebrenica municipality
should be removed from RS jurisdiction and that the RS itself should be
abolished through more far-reaching constitutional changes. Their Serb
counterparts have responded by both defending the legitimacy of the RS and
offering economic and fiscal assistance to Srebrenica residents, the Bosniak
returnees among whom have threatened to leave the town once more if their
demands are not met. In close coordination with the US government, in my
capacity as EUSR, I am preparing for a broad constitutional reform process
to be set up and operating in the second half of 2007.
6. In November NATO invited BiH to join its Partnership for Peace (PfP),
together with Serbia and Montenegro. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer stressed in the aftermath of the decision that NATO still expected the
three countries to improve their cooperation with the ICTY.
7. In December BiH scored another success when, after hard negotiations
over agricultural imports with its neighbours, it joined the Central European
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Just as PfP is an anteroom to full NATO
membership, CEFTA provides the Western Balkan states with a single set of
EU-harmonised trade rules. Meanwhile, economic growth remained healthy,
with an increase in real GDP (despite the one-time boost in inflation to 6.8 per
cent following the introduction of VAT) and rising exports.
8. The security situation was stable during the reporting
period. Only a few security incidents or cases of nationally motivated
violence or vandalism were noted. The most serious took place around
Mostar and in areas of Bosniak return to the RS during the summer.
9. Political processes in Mostar hardened in the second half of
the year. No progress had been made by summer in finalising the
systemisation of the administration, forming an urban planning institution,
resolving the status of Hercegovacka Radio-Television and various cultural
institutions, or forming a single public utility company. I therefore
appointed a special envoy, Mr Norbert Winterstein, to mediate, arbitrate or
recommend other solutions to outstanding disputes. He successfully
resolved several of these longstanding issues, but I was required in December to
impose solutions pertaining to urban and spatial planning that he had
recommended but had been unable to convince the polarised parties to adopt.
10. Brcko District was also characterised by mounting party disputes
within the majority coalition and declining effectiveness on the part of the
government, all exacerbated by the state-wide election campaign, uncertainty
over the District’s post-supervisory future, and continuous disputes over
revenue allocation from the BiH Single Account. Dr Raffi Gregorian
succeeded Mrs Susan Johnson as Supervisor in September, just in time to take
part in the negotiation of a state law on Brcko District that will seek to
regulate the District’s long-term status and prerogatives. Dr Gregorian
also instituted changes to the District’s Statute that will make for more
functional and accountable government.
11. As noted above and predicted in my previous report, the uncertain
regional situation and, in particular, mounting tension occasioned by both the
approach to and deferment of a Kosovo status decision impacted unhelpfully on
BiH politics and political discourse over the period. The independence
referendum in Montenegro in May set the scene for much loose and inflammatory
talk of both “self-determination” in Republika Srpska and abolition of the
entities in the Federation during the election campaign. This continued as
Belgrade officials attempted to link the fates of Kosovo and the RS. Prime
Minister Dodik also used the renegotiation of the parallel relations agreement
with Serbia, Belgrade’s offer to build a new bridge across the River Sava at
Bosanska Raca, and the lucrative sale of the entity’s telecommunications
operator to its state-owned Serbian counterpart to reinforce his close economic
and political connections with Serbia.
12. OHR staff continued to work towards fulfilling the OHR Workplan and
revised Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) that were approved by the Peace
Implementation Council in March 2006. Our efforts were hampered, however,
both by pre-election politicking and by the post-election interregnum as parties
slowly negotiated the formation of new coalition governments. The Workplan
and MIP completion rates suffered accordingly.
13. It is this uncertain regional environment, combined with the
virtual halt in reform and the prolonged void in government following the
elections, that convinced me that it would be rash to proceed with the planned
closure of OHR and transition to a solely EUSR operation in BiH after June
2007. The Peace Implementation Council Steering Board endorsed this view
at its meeting in Brussels on 26-27 February. In line with the general
consensus of PIC Steering Board members, there was agreement to aim for OHR
closure by 30 June 2008 and to review the situation in October 2007 and February
2008. The PIC Steering Board underlined that the policy of ownership
remains the guiding principle and that the International Community will help
Bosnia and Herzegovina to make the final steps from peace implementation to
Euro-Atlantic integration as soon as possible. Russia stated that it
was unable to join this consensus and that it would make conclusions consistent
with UN Security Council Resolution 1722. I had announced in January that
I would not seek an extension of my mandate beyond June 2007.
I. Introduction
14. This is my second report to the Secretary-General since assuming
the office of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 31 January
2006. As has been the norm, it assesses progress made towards attaining
the goals outlined in previous reports, reviews developments during the
reporting period and provides my assessment of mandate implementation.
II. Political Update
15. The results of the 1 October general elections were certified on 27
October – a few days before the legal deadline – but the broad contours of the
resulting political landscape in BiH had been far more quickly
discernible. The big winners were Milorad Dodik (and his SNSD) and Haris
Silajdžić (and, to a slightly lesser extent, his SBiH). Their victories
were also victories for the radical and polarising political rhetoric they had
employed during the campaign, which had centred on their antithetical
conceptions of the future constitutional order in BiH. The irony of the
result is that their two parties are now condemned to cohabitation in government
and future progress will largely depend on the ability of Dodik and Silajdžić to
find mutually acceptable compromises.
16. The other notable result of the October poll was the blow
administered to the ‘big three’ nationalist parties – the SDA, SDS and HDZ BiH –
that had dominated their respective people’s political horizons since
1990. Although diminished in strength, all three will, however, continue
to be important players. In fact, only the SDS will be excluded from a
share in power at the state and entity levels. The traditional nationalist
parties’ relative or absolute defeats did not mean, of course, a defeat for
nationalist politics. The victors simply proved more adept at mobilising
national sentiments and issues, accusing the formerly dominant nationalists of
having failed to stand firm on salient national issues such as constitutional
reform and the balance between state and entity prerogatives.
17. With 41 out of the 83 seats in the RS National Assembly, Dodik came
close to winning an absolute majority and more than doubled the SNSD’s previous
19 seats. The SDS, by contrast, saw its tally fall from 26 to 17
seats. It promptly repudiated its latterly moderate leader and defeated
candidate for re-election as RS president, Dragan Čavić, and turned to the
right. Dodik, for his part, needed only to offer ministerial office to a
few smaller parties to construct a strong majority and, then, to reshuffle his
existing cabinet. Having done so, he won confirmation by the RSNA on 29
November.
18. In the Federation the SDA retained its position as the biggest
Bosniak party with 28 seats in the lower house, but this loss of just four
mandates understated the party’s relative defeat in the face of the SBiH’s jump
from 15 to 24 seats and Silajdžić’s clear victory over SDA leader Sulejman Tihić
in the race for the Bosniak place on the BiH Presidency. The long-dominant
Croat party, the HDZ BiH, lost half of its previous 16 seats in the Federation
lower house, but still edged out the breakaway HDZ 1990, which won seven.
On the other hand, the HDZ 1990, in combination with smaller Croat parties,
claimed leadership of the majority Croat coalition once all the cantonal
assemblies had elected their delegates to the upper house, the House of
Peoples.
19. A feature common to both entity parliaments elected in 2006 is that
the number of parties winning seats was reduced, so making political management
easier. No Croat parties, for example, won seats in the RSNA, though the
number of Croat deputies (elected as SNSD candidates) remained the same at
four. The number of predominantly Bosniak parties winning seats in the
RSNA remained the same (three), but their total number of seats fell from ten to
eight. On the other hand, the SNSD won two seats in the Federation
parliament.
Government formation
20. The SDA and SBIH leaders quickly agreed in October on an undefined
post-election coalition, but serious talks about forming a state-level
government did not begin until mid-November. They continued in desultory
fashion until year’s end, but picked up speed and purpose in
January. The major sticking point throughout was which of the two
HDZs would share power, since the SDA preferred the HDZ BiH and the SBiH wanted
a partnership with the HDZ 1990, which had also opposed the March set of
constitutional reforms. For its part, the HDZ BiH long rejected any notion
that both Croat parties should enter government. In the end, the Council
of Ministers confirmed by parliament on 9 February and the Federation government
finally established on 30 March contained ministers from both Croat parties.
21. Despite the fact that the business of forming the state and
Federation governments was long and tortuous, it was a positive sign that the
SNSD was determined both to occupy the prime executive post at state level, so
according the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers enhanced importance, as
well as to take ministerial office in the Federation for the first time.
In addition to the chairmanship of the CoM, the SNSD took two of the more
important state-level ministries. It was an equally healthy sign that
there were no demands that the international community should intervene to
broker a deal. Although Dodik stated before the CoM was established that
the governing majority would be a purely mathematical combination – not a real
coalition – and that the SNSD would focus on running ‘its’ ministries, his
interest in the chairmanship and the calibre of his ministerial nominees hinted
otherwise.
22. Although the six parties that signed up to the March 2006 package
of constitutional reforms won the two-thirds majority of seats that would be
required to pass the amendments on a second attempt, two (the SDP and SDS) have
gone into opposition and announced that they can no longer be counted upon to
back the amendments, while a third (the SDA) is internally split on the
issue. The combination in government of parties wholly opposed to the
package (SBiH and HDZ 1990) with those who still favour it (SNSD and HDZ BiH)
and one that is now equivocal (SDA) means that no clear way ahead is yet
visible. The PIC Steering Board nonetheless reaffirmed its view that early
adoption of the package would constitute a positive first step and provide a
basis on which to establish a broader process by mid-2007 that would help Bosnia
and Herzegovina meet the requirements of a modern European state.
23. As noted above, the new but little changed RS government was
confirmed in office on 29 November, celebrating in mid-March the achievements of
its first 100 days while Federation politicians were still wrangling over
portfolios – and particularly those to be allotted to the Croat parties.
Once this was done, there followed a rushed attempt on 22 March to subvert the
process whereby my office vets nominees for five sensitive ministries. The
ostensible reason for the sudden haste was the need to adopt and enact the
Federation’s 2007 budget before the expiry of the temporary financing authority
on which the caretaker government had operated.
24. Having warned parliamentarians that vetting was not yet complete
and asked them to postpone their session for the day or two that would be
required, the House of Representatives nonetheless proceeded to elect the new
government. I was thus compelled to nullify the House’s vote on 23
March. Since one ministerial candidate did not, in the event, pass the
vetting procedure, I asked the relevant party (the SBiH) to nominate
another. This it promptly did, so permitting an accelerated vetting
procedure and a new session of parliament on 30 March. The cabinet was
duly confirmed and the 2007 budget passed.
25. The new Federation House of Representatives had convened within the
prescribed deadline on 21 November, but did so only to swear in MPs and to
recess. Most cantonal assemblies did not even do that. Moreover, the
cantons’ failures to respect deadlines made it impossible to form the Federation
House of Peoples (which is elected from the cantons) and the BiH House of
Peoples (two-thirds of whose members are elected from its Federation
counterpart) before February. In addition, there will continue to be a
small ‘deficit’ of Serbs in the Federation House of Peoples, since not enough
were elected to the cantonal assemblies. Moreover, three cantons remained
without new governments at the end of March.
Party-political realignments and reactions
26. The immediate post-election period saw the weakened leaders of the
SDA and SDS facing revolts over their parties’ disappointing results.
While Tihić (SDA) survived, Čavić (SDS) was forced out in mid-November.
The SDS has now reverted to the intransigence of its earlier days, but is
unlikely to be able to outflank Dodik in this regard. The newly elected SDS
leadership has nevertheless been openly flirting with former SDS officials
removed for support of “Persons Indicted for War Crimes” (PIFWCs).
27. The new HDZ 1990 bucked the trend established by earlier breakaway
parties from the HDZ BiH in winning a substantial number of seats at the state,
Federation and cantonal levels. The HDZ 1990 benefited from perceptions
that it was backed by both the HDZ government in Zagreb and the Catholic Church,
as well as from the conviction in the autumn of HDZ BiH leader Dragan Čović for
financial crimes when he was Federation finance minister.
28. The major non-nationalist (or non-national) party, the Social
Democrats (SDP), failed to make significant headway, but is set to remain the
strongest opposition party in the state and Federation parliaments. The
party’s one success, the election of its candidate, Željko Komšić, to the Croat
seat on the Presidency stemmed from the split between the two HDZs and the votes
of SDP loyalists among all three constituent peoples. The explicitly Croat
parties cried foul and denounced the legitimacy of a Croat supposedly elected by
non-Croats, but their protests petered out rapidly. SDP leader Zlatko
Lagumdžija subsequently called for a vote of confidence in his leadership, which
he won easily.
29. Claims by Dodik that the secessionist rhetoric that characterised
the campaign in the RS would evaporate after the election have, by in large,
been borne out by events. On 28 March, RS President Milan Jelic stated
that the SNSD had abandoned their pre-election rhetoric on an RS referendum as
the international community and OHR have clearly said that the RS could not be
abolished and so there was no need for a referendum. The RS prime minister did,
however, keep the notion of a referendum alive by proposing instead to call one
on policing should the existence of the RS police be threatened. (This was
an idea he borrowed from the SDS). RS-based NGOs, however, have continued
to agitate on behalf of referenda on both policing and secession.
Constitutional Reform
30. As noted above, the future of the first-ever package of
constitutional amendments in post-Dayton BiH remains uncertain.
Nonetheless, constitutional reform was an inescapable subject during the
coalition negotiations and will remain on the agenda no matter how divided the
new governments may be on the issue. Although nearly everyone agrees that
constitutional change is necessary if BiH is to have functional, affordable and
EU-compatible governance, few agree on the nature and scope of the
reforms. Most Serbs want an explicitly federal state composed of three
‘national-majority’ units, though any effort to define the prospective
boundaries of such units undermines potential Serb-Croat concord on this
point. Bosniaks, on the other hand, continue to favour an integral or
‘civil’ state, the territorial sub-units of which would be merely administrative
– and certainly not national or constituent. This is unacceptable to Serbs
and Croats because they see it as guaranteeing majority, that is, Bosniak
rule.
31. Bosniaks’ determination to purse the goal of an entity-free BiH has
been reinforced by the International Court of Justice’s 26 February
verdict. The court’s finding that the wartime institutions of the RS were
responsible for genocide in Srebrenica has provided an opening: first for
demanding Srebrenica’s removal from RS jurisdiction, then for the elimination of
the RS police and, eventually, for the abolition of the entity itself.
32. Although both the US government and I had hoped to work for speedy
adoption of the modest package of amendments that failed in April, making it
clear that this was but the first step in what would have to be a more
thoroughgoing process of constitutional reform, the omens are far from good at
present. In the medium term, however, both the pressure of events and the
development of a popularly inclusive procedure involving the BiH Parliament,
outside experts and civil society could forge the necessary consensus for
change. This will require an effective structure, combining both
international and Bosnian experts, and a strong secretariat to support the BiH
Parliament and maintain momentum. There will thus be a key role for the
international community to play, particularly the EU, led by the EUSR and the
US, in supporting the initiation of this process and facilitating progress over
the next few years.
33. Also on the constitutional front, I was obliged on 23 March to
issue an order to assure the integrity of decisions taken by my predecessors and
myself and to make sure that the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina abide by
their obligations under the Dayton Peace Accords and UN Security Council
resolutions. The need for this order arose from a July 2006 ruling by the
BiH Constitutional Court on an appeal for redress from two persons removed from
office by my predecessor in 2004 in relation to non-cooperation with the
ICTY. The court, although not directly challenging this decision, had
ordered the state authorities to take steps to establish a remedy for such
removal decisions. My order establishes a process whereby the authorities
will be able to comply with the Constitutional Court’s ruling without, at the
same time, violating their obligations to respect and implement decisions of the
High Representative taken under Annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement for
Peace. The order prohibits the establishment of any review mechanism by
the BiH authorities while obliging them to refer such matters to the High
Representative, as Chair of the Peace Implementation Council Steering
Board.
34. This order was made following close consultations with PIC Steering
Board members and others. On 27 February the PIC Steering Board had
reminded all institutions that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international
obligations under the GFAP and the United Nations Charter must be respected and
called upon me to take appropriate actions to ensure that BiH fulfils these
international obligations.
III. European Partnership
Requirements
35. The technical rounds of SAA negotiations completed in 2006 proved
constructive. Their focus was on trade concessions, the movement of goods,
approximation of laws, law enforcement and competition rules, mutual assistance
in customs matters, dispute settlement mechanisms, and transitional
periods. No breakthroughs were made, however, on the preconditions for
signing a SAA: police restructuring, public broadcasting reform and ICTY
cooperation.
Police Restructuring
36. In December 2006, the Directorate for Police Restructuring
Implementation (“Directorate”) completed its 36-page final report, “Proposed
Plan for the Implementation of the Reform of Police Structures in Bosnia And
Herzegovina,”as mandated by the October 2005 Agreement on Restructuring of
Police Structures (Political Agreement). The Directorate submitted its
report to the BiH Ministry of Security on 27 December 2006 and on 3 January 2007
the Ministry of Security forwarded it to the secretary general of the caretaker
Council of Ministers.
37. The report was the result of 12 months’ work, during which the
Steering Board of the Directorate held 28 meetings (15 during the reporting
period). There were numerous delays, however, stemming largely from the RS
government’s obstruction of and objections to the legitimacy of the process,
notwithstanding the fact that the RS National Assembly had adopted the Political
Agreement and Serb ministers in the CoM had supported the formation of the
Directorate. RS opposition to the process culminated in a decision in May
2006 to downgrade RS representation on the Steering Board to that of
observer. Directorate members from RS institutions maintained their status
as observers for the remainder of the Directorate’s mandate, although Serb
representatives of the state continued to participate.
38. As a result of these delays and obstructions, the report was
submitted three months after the deadline foreseen in the October 2005 Political
Agreement and minus some of the elements specified by that agreement. In
particular, it does not include draft legal acts or rulebooks, a timetable for
the overall implementation period, or a map of police regions.
39. The proposed policing system provides for an organisationally
integrated structure with decentralised police operations and
decision-making. The consolidation of administrative services (human
resources, finance, procurement, IT/communications), which are currently
duplicated in each of the existing fifteen police forces, is perhaps the most
far-reaching aspect of the report. The new system also envisages a single
forensics centre and police academy. The local policing level would
operate with fairly extensive autonomy, although the future Director of Police
and the Directorate for Police Coordination would provide an operational
hierarchy.
40. The report also offers concrete solutions designed to implement the
three guiding principles set by the European Union:
1. All legislative and budgetary competencies
for all police matters must be vested at the state level.
2. No political interference with operational
policing.
3. Functional local police areas must be
determined by technical policing criteria, where operational command is
exercised at the local level.
41. As for the first principle, the report clearly establishes that the
state should be vested with exclusive legislative competency for all police
matters and that other levels of government cannot legislate on police
matters. The report also envisages a single police budget to be adopted by
the BiH Parliamentary Assembly. Regarding the second principle, the report
provides for numerous oversight mechanisms designed to keep politics out of
policing, mainly through parliamentary watchdogs and institutions such as the
Independent Board and Public Complaints Office. On the third principle,
the report enumerates specific technical guidelines and criteria for forming
local policing areas, but it does not contain a map suggesting what they should
be.
42. In line with the Political Agreement, the state and entity
governments and parliaments will need to adopt the Directorate’s proposal, along
with any agreed amendments. Because of the earlier withdrawal of RS
support from the Directorate, continuing Serb determination to maintain the RS
name for police forces deployed on its territory, and a reinforced Bosniak view
that no such thing must happen, the forging of a political consensus on the
Directorate’s report, let alone the number and shape of local policing regions,
has thus far proved impossible. My office has organised or participated in
numerous meetings among party leaders this year, as well as conducting bilateral
negotiations.
43. At several points it has looked as if progress was being made, most
notably at a meeting of Serb and Bosniak leaders on 14 March, the day before EU
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn arrived in Sarajevo. Although Dodik on
that day shifted his position significantly towards meeting the three EC
principles, Silajdzic and Tihic deemed this to be insufficient, offering
compromise only after Rehn had left and Dodik had back-tracked. Failure to
reach political agreement and, then, quickly to translate such an agreement into
parliamentary acts and legislation on implementation may make it increasingly
difficult for BiH to sign a SAA before the end of 2007.
IV. Entrenching the Rule of Law
44. In addition to police reform, my office has continued to focus on
facilitating and consolidating the implementation of other rule of law reforms,
especially those that aim to build the capacity of existing law enforcement
agencies and the BiH State Court.
45. OHR/EUSR has worked over the period with the BiH Ministry of
Security, the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the State Border
Service (SBS) and the entity and cantonal interior ministries and police to
build their capacity, particularly in the fight against organised crime.
We have also worked to enhance the capability of the recently formed BiH Service
for Foreigners’ Affairs.
46. In the second half of 2006 my colleagues sought to identify
systemic problems in the work of prosecutors and to facilitate improved
cooperation between them and the police. They also produced an analysis of
strategies and best practices in the prosecution of organised crime in other
European countries and distributed it to local prosecutors.
47. OHR contributed as well to ensuring a successful transition by the
Registry of the State Court to full domestic ownership by concluding a new
registry agreement. Replacing the December 2004 original, the new
agreement provides for a gradual transfer of responsibility for the Registry to
domestic institutions. Of particular importance are the provisions which give
authority to the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council to appoint all judges
to the State Court and all prosecutors to the State Prosecutor’s Office, as well
as provisions reorganising the Registry and its financing. The agreement
also provides for the integration of national Registry staff into domestic
judicial institutions between 2006 and 2009. The goal is to ensure that
BiH assumes full responsibility for the State Court and Prosecutor’s Office in
regard to finance, administration and personnel matters, as well as to guarantee
the long-term sustainability and capacity of domestic judicial institutions to
process war crimes and organised crime cases.
V. Cooperation with the ICTY
48. A number of complex trials for war crimes remain underway in the
State Court. The court also initiated trials of cases transferred from the
ICTY in the reporting period (Savo Todović, Mitar Rašević and Paško Ljubičić).
The first instance verdict in another case transferred from The Hague (Radovan
Stanković) was handed down in November, with the accused being found guilty of
crimes against humanity and sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment.
49. There was little or no progress in capturing remaining ICTY
fugitives. In December, however, the RS government adopted a new Action
Plan directed at the location, apprehension or voluntary surrender of ICTY
fugitives. We shall be looking forward to seeing it implemented. In
the meantime, my colleagues and I will continue to monitor and exhort the
authorities in BiH, in particular the RS authorities, in this matter.
50. In addition to its 27 February decision not to close OHR in June
2007, the PIC Steering Board directed OHR to reinforce its efforts to secure
full cooperation with the ICTY by the domestic authorities during its remaining
tenure. My office is making every effort to do so, all the more so because
of the simultaneous judgment of the International Court of Justice and the
political impact it has had in BiH.
VI. Reforming the Economy
51. Now that the new governments are in place it is imperative that
they should both rise to the challenges ahead and deal with a substantial
backlog of essential fiscal and economic legislation. The country not only
needs to maintain sound macroeconomic policies, but it must also make
substantial progress on the structural reforms required to lay the foundations
for sustained, private sector-led growth.
52. That said, economic growth has remained relatively robust, and it
is likely that real GDP growth of 5 per cent in 2005 will increase to 5.7 per
cent in 2006. The introduction of VAT inevitably impacted on retail
prices, producing a one-time rise in the average rate of inflation to 6.8 per
cent. Exports have picked up and, with improved statistics, the current
account deficit should show a narrowing from 21 per cent of GDP in 2005 to about
13.5 percent of GDP in 2006. The external deficit, however, remains very
large.
VAT Introduction
53. The successful introduction of value-added tax was the undoubted
high point of economic reform in 2006. Projected revenue collection from
VAT for 2006 was KM 3.5 billion. Actual revenues far exceeded the initial
projection, reaching a final total of slightly more than KM 4 billion.
There continues to be intense disagreement, however, over the formula for
allocating these revenues among the entities and Brcko District, making it clear
that the current methodology represents a constant source of contention.
As a consequence, revenues from the Single Account have only been allocated on a
monthly or bi-monthly basis, and sometimes in arrears. This contention has
also caused delays in reaching an agreement on the National Fiscal Council,
which still has no basis in law and has, therefore, neither an effective
mechanism for breaking deadlocks among its members nor any means of enforcing
its decisions.
Budgets
54. The effects of the unsatisfactory level of intergovernmental
coordination and the lack of a law on the National Fiscal Council were again
obvious. Preparation of the 2007 budgets continued to be marred by such
weaknesses. Governments are boosting their spending in an inefficient and
shortsighted manner, albeit not dangerously. But this tendency poses a
fiscal risk if revenues stagnate, let alone drop, for the governments quickly
came to rely on steadily increasing revenues during 2006.
Business Environment
55. Progress in improving the business environment, restructuring
corporations and making structural reforms slowed in 2006. According to
the World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 2006,
improvements have mainly been made in taxation, customs and trade
regulation. However, all efforts to centralise banking supervision at
state level or to adopt laws crucial for creating a single economic space in BiH
(e.g., laws on obligations and pharmaceuticals) have failed or been postponed.
My office has also been engaged in improving the business environment through
institutional support for business associations and trade chambers, as well as
in encouraging socio-economic dialogue.
56. Corporate restructuring has proceeded slowly and progress in
strengthening corporate governance has been modest in comparison to neighbouring
countries. The absence of political interest or will has stymied
significant privatisation efforts in the Federation, although there has been
significant progress in the RS in privatising a number of large companies.
Infrastructure reform
57. While the demand for most modes of transport is growing markedly,
the absence of an overall national infrastructure policy is a major
problem. This is partly due to the lack of institutional capacity, but
also to politics, particularly in the railway sector. The situation is
slightly better in the electricity industry, which has been restructured with
significant assistance from the World Bank, European Commission and several
other donors. The main challenges will be to increase the power-generation
capacity in a transparent and competitive process with the objective of
achieving a balance between risks and benefits, both for BiH and investors.
VII. Public Administration Reform
58. The state, entity and Brcko District governments adopted the
National Public Administration Reform (PAR) Strategy prepared by the BiH PAR
Coordinator during the reporting period. Six inter-governmental working
groups were established to work on its implementation. The strategy
encompasses the six horizontal PAR areas: human resources, legislative drafting,
administrative procedures, information technology, institutional communications
and public finance. OHR provided both political support and technical
assistance throughout the adoption process.
59. Although the working groups have been set up, implementation of the
action plan has yet to begin in earnest. This will need to be the focus in
coming months, and OHR will, within its means and capabilities, seek to assist
the authorities in doing so. Initiating the implementation of the
comprehensive PAR action plan is a key short-term priority of the European
Partnership and a condition for signing a SAA.
VIII. Defence Reform
60. NATO member states invited BiH to join the alliance’s Partnership
for Peace (PfP) on 29 November 2006. This signified fulfilment of one of
the main benchmarks of success in defence reform. Meanwhile, work
continued throughout the period on transferring all property identified by the
BiH Ministry of Defence as necessary for defence purposes from the entities to
the state. This effort was hampered, however, by the RS government’s
repeated refusals to comply with the relevant provisions of the Defence
Law. Work on transferring EUFOR’s residual Dayton tasks and functions to
the BiH authorities also intensified. But BiH remains in need of
legislation providing for the oversight of movements of weapons and military
equipment (WME) within the country, including the structures required to ensure
implementation. The domestic authorities worked as well on programmes
aimed at safely disposing of surplus WME. However, without transfers of
ownership by the entities, these programmes cannot be implemented.
61. After much political wrangling and discussion of relative national
representation in the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH), on 5 July 2006 the state
Presidency finally adopted a decision on their size and structure that allows
for the development of an increasingly integrated force. It thus offers a
solid basis for future progress while providing immediately for the AFBiH to
have niche capabilities in the spheres of de-mining and explosive-ordnance
disposal. There is a realistic ratio of officers to non-commissioned
officers and soldiers (2:3:5). The force will be fully professional, with
no conscripts and no passive reserve. PfP membership will help ensure that
improvements continue to be made, particularly since BiH has begun to
participate in the NATO force-development process. The BiH Chief of Joint Staff
has produced an implementation plan with timelines for the stand-up of all
elements of the AFBiH. This plan aims to ensure that the legally defined
dates for the formation of headquarters and the battalions assigned to them can
be met. It is likely, however, that these timelines will slip, owing to
the fact that the selection process for military personnel is not yet
complete.
62. BiH submitted its Presentation Document to NATO before the end of
2006. It has been accepted and BiH is now preparing its Individual
Partnership Plan. On 16 March 2007 BiH also signed a NATO Security
Agreement that defines parameters for the exchange of information between NATO
and BiH, including document handling, security clearances and the like.
The initial phases of the Planning and Review Process have also begun.
63. Although not a defence-reform issue per se,
BiH recently dispatched its fifth contingent (an Explosive Ordnance Disposal
platoon) to serve with the US-led coalition in Iraq. Each contingent has
served for six months. Platoon members are volunteers drawn from the AFBiH
as a whole and, as with other, smaller deployments in the past (e.g. with the UN
in Ethiopia/Eritrea), they represent all three constituent peoples.
IX. Intelligence Reform
64. The BiH Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) fine-tuned its
organisational structure during the reporting period in order to take on the
responsibility for security vetting prescribed by the Law on the Protection of
Secret Data. A first batch of OSA employees commenced training on both
operational and analytical aspects of the agency’s work. Such training, as
well as consultations with international experts, remained a priority.
Both executive control and parliamentary oversight of OSA continued to mature.
65. OSA underlined its ability to act as the key point of contact in
BiH for counter-terrorism efforts through its membership of several
international forums for intelligence cooperation. Bilateral donors
provided both training and material assistance. OHR will continue to work
with the OSCE Mission to BiH and other partners to consolidate the agency’s
compliance with all aspects of the laws that regulate it and to ensure both
proper executive control and effective parliamentary oversight.
X. The European Union Millitary Mission (EU Force in BiH)
66. The European Union Military Mission (EUFOR) continued to conduct
operations to ensure compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace
and to maintain a safe and secure environment. EUFOR troops conducted a
number of operations, including presence patrolling, observation activities,
weapons’ collections and specific operations targeted at the support networks of
war-crimes indictees and associated criminal elements. Thanks to
improvements in the security situation, EUFOR started to reduce and, in some
areas, to end routine patrolling towards the end of 2006.
67. EUFOR maintained some 6,000 troops from 22 EU member states and 12
other countries. The force remained deployed in three regional
multi-national task forces based in Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla, in addition to
44 Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) throughout the country.
68. As a result of new common operational guidelines established
between EUFOR and EUPM, EUFOR ceased to conduct independent operations targeting
organised crime. Instead it backs up domestic law enforcement agencies
when their requests for support are endorsed by EUPM. Having fulfilled its
mandate, the EUSR-chaired Crime Strategy Group formerly tasked with overseeing
the coordination and coherence of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy in
support of the BiH authorities’ fight against organised crime closed down in
November.
69. The EU decided in principle on 11 December to downsize EUFOR during
2007. The EU’s Political and Security Committee confirmed this decision on
27 February. Implementation has begun and is due to be completed in the
summer, when EUFOR will consist of some 2,500 troops in country. The new
force posture that is planned provides for the retention of one battalion and
two Independent Police Unit (IPU) companies, based at Camp Butmir near Sarajevo,
while additional battalions will be available ‘over the horizon’ to reinforce
EUFOR at short notice. EUFOR will, however, maintain a countrywide
presence in the form of LOT deployments, the purpose of which is to provide
EUFOR with real-time situational awareness.
XI. Refugee and Displaced-Person Return
70. OHR handed over GFAP Annex 7 responsibility for refugee and
displaced-person returns to the domestic authorities at the end of 2003, when
property repossession was nearly complete. Property repossession has since
been completed throughout the country, all municipalities having dealt with
outstanding first instanceapplications for repossession of dwellings.
71. Permanent returns – and the sustainability of those returns – are,
however, different matters. Unlike the number of repossessions, it is
virtually impossible to offer a reliable estimate of the number of people who
have returned physically to their pre-war homes. While the number of
potential returnees grows ever smaller with the passage of time, a
re-registration exercise undertaken by the Ministry for Human Rights and
Refugees revealed that there are still 130,000 displaced persons in BiH who want
to return to their pre-war homes. They need and deserve support, as do
those who have returned but who often lead precarious lives. Field visits
undertaken by OHR and UNHCR staff found that an alarming number of ‘minority’
returnees to rural areas lacked the rudiments of modern life, such as
electricity and running water.
XII. Mostar
72. Persistent intervention by my office in the affairs of the city of
Mostar was necessary in the second half of 2006. The political parties
continued to stall or block the reorganisation of the city administration, the
formation of a single public utility company to cope with ongoing waste-disposal
problems and any resolution of the status of the city-owned but Croat-controlled
Hercegovacka Radio-Television (HRT). Moreover, the Croat-Bosniak dispute
over urban planning threatened to create new parallel structures. All of
these contentious issues continued to threaten the city’s normal functioning and
unity.
73. After the city authorities failed repeatedly to meet several
deadlines I set for resolving these issues – as well as to take up the
opportunity I offered them to settle the HRT dispute through arbitration – it
became necessary by September to appoint a special OHR envoy to Mostar. I
tasked the experienced Norbert Winterstein to try to build the political
consensus necessary to make decisions, as well as to arbitrate in cases where no
consensus could be forged. If even arbitration were not acceptable, I
asked him to propose solutions to me.
74. Mr Winterstein soon succeeded in obtaining the consent of the city
council to arbitrate the final status of HRT. He decided that HRT must be
either transferred to new ownership or liquidated by 31 March 2007. On 30
March the City Council passed a decision to transfer ownership of HRT to three
Croat-majority cantons, although they have not yet formally accepted such a
transfer. Mr Winterstein also succeeded in brokering agreements on the
formation of a single public utility company and in pushing ahead with the
reorganization of the city administration.
75. Since urban-planning issues could not be resolved by compromise, as
a last resort I issued two decisions on 22 December to establish urban and
spatial planning bodies in the city. The Bosniak-dominated parties took
these decisions as attacks on them and criticised them as biased.
76. Although Special Envoy Winterstein made
significant progress in securing agreements and proposing decisions, the
difficult work of implementation lies ahead during 2007. Continued
obstruction may leave me no choice but to use the Bonn Powers again.
Mostar remains politically unstable, and will continue to require OHR
attention.
XIII. Brcko District
77. Since 1999, when the Final Arbitral Award established Brcko
District as a single, multi-ethnic administrative unit under an international
supervisor, the district developed a political culture that was distinct from
the rest of the country. Problems were solved locally, without recourse to
national political parties, even after the first district-wide elections in
October 2004. Lately, however, this has begun to change. The
political radicalisation accompanying the general election campaign and the
approach of the end of the supervisory regime combined to create a new and
negative dynamic. Fearful of a future without a supervisor to check
nationalist excesses, parties have been playing up ethnic issues that had
hitherto stayed in the background.
78. Serb politicians were concerned during the period about the need to
appoint a new police chief. They believed the chief should be a Serb
because his predecessor had been a Serb, but also because Bosniak politicians
were reportedly expressing the desire to get hold of major enforcement positions
in the government, including the police chief (the acting chief was a Bosniak),
the new auditor and the public attorney, in addition to the mayoral and
prosecutor positions they already held.
79. Accusations of corruption and national discrimination have been
bandied about without regard to facts or evidence. Bureaucratic inertia,
laziness and incompetence are often mistaken for deliberate actions. The
government has procrastinated in making preparations to create an independent
Health Insurance Fund and Public Utility Company and initially failed to provide
for them in its draft 2007 budget. The District Assembly duly rejected it,
displaying the dysfunctional relationship between the government and the
assembly majority that has come to prevail.
80. Leaders already seem to be positioning themselves for the 2008
elections, both by raising nationalist issues and, increasingly, taking their
cues (if not direction) from Banja Luka, Sarajevo or Mostar. This has had the
effect of making some of the parties forming the governing coalition distance
themselves from the work of their own government and not to support government
proposals in the assembly, the better to pursue party and personal
interests. The situation culminated on 28 December, when Bosniak
councillors staged a walkout during the assembly’s last session of the year in
reaction to proposed reforms and the reallocation of positions resulting from
government restructuring.
81. Outside influences on local political leaders are likely to
intensify as the Supervisor’s departure nears. The mayor could be weakened
further, and may continue to rely upon the supervisor to compensate for the
inadequacies of his government and bureaucracy. To counter these
deficiencies, the Supervisor has focussed on increasing government
accountability, performance and reform in order to diminish the impact of party
politics on government services. Seven Supervisory Orders in February and
March sought to promote this agenda. Dr Gregorian appointed a new police
chief, restored two buildings to religious communities, amended the District
Statute, appointed members of the Audit Office, and dismissed five officials
dealing with urban planning issues. These actions have had a positive
effect on restoring Brcko as a place of realised reform and great
potential.
82. In November the Supervisor presented to the Brcko District Assembly
the draft BiH Law on Brcko District and explained the process by which a joint
working group had prepared it. The post-election interregnum precluded the
caretaker CoM from adopting and proposing the draft law to parliament. The
new CoM now needs to do so, but it has also become evident that state and entity
governments remain to be convinced that the law is adequate to the
purpose.
83. Following a series of decisions that short-changed Brcko in terms
of revenue, the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA) Governing Board finally
adjusted the revenue-allocation coefficients for December and January to reflect
the final-consumption criteria when it met on 22 December. The
re-balancing exercise for January-September 2006 returned nearly KM 7 million to
Brcko. It remains to be seen, however, whether the final re-balancing,
delayed as a consequence of there being no Federation finance minister, will
restore all the funds that Brcko claims are owed. The district had
meanwhile filed its submission asking for relief from the Arbitral Tribunal by
the 30 November deadline. The submission complains that the ITA regime
violates two principles of the Final Award. If the parties do not resolve
their dispute in a timely fashion, it will be necessary to consider alternative
solutions.
XIV. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Region
84. As a multinational state whose three constituent peoples also
inhabit its neighbouring countries, BiH cannot escape regional disputes or
instability. Even the ordinary politics of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro
impact upon it. The RS government, in particular, has felt compelled to do
Belgrade’s bidding on numerous occasions.
85. As I have emphasised above, however, the uncertainty over Kosovo’s
future status and the delays in the announcement of the UN mediator’s proposals
had an especially baleful influence during the 2006 election campaign and
thereafter. In fact, this risk of regional instability is a principal
reason why I concluded that it would be rash to close OHR and renounce the Bonn
Powers as early as 30 June 2007, the target date set by the PIC in June
2006. Until such time as Kosovo’s status is both settled and accepted –
and arguments and passions attempting to draw BiH into the equation are moot and
spent – fundamental changes in the nature of the international engagement in BiH
must be considered carefully. The country may be peaceable and secure, but
it is also vulnerable, both to external developments and their domestic
reverberations, as well as to homegrown political instability. The
reverberations set off by the 26 February verdict of the International Court of
Justice are a case in point.
86. Any perceived diminution of international interest in BiH or any
apparent weakening of resolve to uphold its sovereignty and territorial
integrity could invite trouble. NATO’s invitation to BiH to join PfP had a
decidedly reassuring effect. Signature of a SAA with the EU would provide
an even greater fillip
87. BiH still has minor border disputes with Serbia and Croatia, though
the potential quarrel over Zagreb’s plan to build a bridge between the mainland
and the Peljesac peninsula that would have restricted BiH’s access to the
Adriatic seems to have abated. Another longstanding irritant to regional
relations – the constitutional bars on extradition of their nationals by Croatia
and Serbia – remains unresolved, although cooperation among prosecutors
continues to improve. Bosniak politicians’ efforts to call the
dual-citizenship agreement with Serbia into question following Montenegro’s
departure from the state union and subsequent lack of interest in concluding a
similar agreement with Croatia have lately been overcome.
XV. The European Union Police Mission
88. During the reporting period EUPM continued its successful work in
co-locations with the local police. It implemented its refocused mandate
and strengthened further its cooperation with EUFOR. With the Common
Operation Guidelines in place, EUPM took the lead in supporting BiH in the fight
against organised crime and corruption, as tasked by the EU’s PSC. The
establishment of the Criminal Justice Interface Unit (CJIU) charged with
addressing deficiencies in cooperation between police and prosecutors was a
positive step. The CJIU focused on enhancing both general and
case-specific cooperation in order to facilitate effective investigations and
prosecutions, as well as to contribute to strengthening the integrity of the
country’s criminal justice system.
89. Pursuant to an operational review conducted at the end of the year,
EUPM concluded that greater effort was required to support the ongoing battle
against organised crime and corruption, including the provision of more hands-on
advice regarding specific cases, in addition to general guidance.
XVI. Non-Certification of Police Officers
90. I continued during the period my efforts to help resolve the vexed
issue of former BiH police officers denied certification by the United Nations
International Police Task Force (IPTF) in 2002. The OHR/EUSR expert team
returned to New York in July and met once more with EU Missions and with the UN
Security Council Coordination and Drafting Group (CDG) and Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to explore possible solutions. In August I
wrote to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General,
expressing my view that OHR/EUSR, in cooperation with the BiH authorities, had
made every effort to provide the information required by the Security Council
and DPKO and that it was up to the UN to take the next steps.
91. In November I reiterated this point in my speech to the Security
Council and later in meetings with the Secretary-General and
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. In response to a
November letter from the DPKO – and reflecting the mounting frustration and
discontent in BiH over the continuing stalemate – I wrote again in December to
the Under-Secretary-General suggesting that it was incumbent upon our respective
organisations to search for new solutions to this old problem. When former
police officers embarked the same month on a hunger strike, the BiH Council of
Ministers reacted by passing a unilateral decision to establish a
domestic review process for officers denied certification by the
IPTF. I called upon the CoM to respect fully its obligations under
international law and pointed out that, were its decision to be implemented, I
would have no choice but to consider further measures. I also called upon
the CoM to contact the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat as a matter of
urgency. Since then, members of my staff have continued to consult with
PIC Steering Board members, BiH institutions and others, including the Council
of Europe.
XVII. Media
Development
92. Efforts to complete public-broadcasting reform suffered a setback
on 19 July at the hands of the Federation Constitutional Court, which ruled that
the entity PBS law imperilled the “vital national interests” of Croats. In
November the Bosniak club in the Federation House of Peoples appealed to the BiH
Constitutional Court, seeking to reverse the entity court’s decision. The
BiH Constitutional Court is not likely to rule on this issue before May.
93. If, however, that judgment is either unfavourable or further
delayed, it will be necessary to introduce a redrafted law that meets the
Federation Constitutional Court’s original and technical objections. In
the meantime, OHR/EUSR will continue to meet regularly with the PBS governors
and other stakeholders to discuss the course of reform and to encourage measures
to modernise and streamline the system.
XVIII. The Mission Implementation Plan and the OHR
Workplan
94. Thirty Workplan items remain outstanding. The PIC Steering
Board asked me in February to revise the Workplan to focus on remaining Dayton
implementation requirements and on consolidating the reforms of state-level
institutions necessary for the stability and sustainability of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
95. Work continued, however, on ensuring that Workplan items could be
completed once the new governments were in place and normal legislative business
resumed. In almost all cases the impediments have not been technical, but
reflected an absence of engagement and determination on the part of the
governing authorities. It remains to be seen how much political will the
state and entity governments will prove able to mobilise. The fact that
the blockage in the Council of Ministers following the ICJ verdict was overcome
in mid-March – and some important decisions taken – may augur
well.
XIX. EU Special Representative (EUSR)
96. In line with my dual mandate as European Union Special
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP), I
continued to promote the priorities listed in the European Partnership document
of 2006, as well as the implementation of the GFAP. I also worked on
behalf of constitutional reform, which remains essential to both rationalise and
strengthen the country’s governance and, by extension, to equip BiH for EU
integration. In my EUSR role I also continued to provide political
oversight of the European Union Police Mission. COMEUFOR, the EUPM
commissioner and I agreed revised the terms of reference for the EU Crime
Strategy Group during the reporting period.
XX. Reinforced EU Engagement in BiH and the Closure of
OHR
97. OHR and EUSR members of staff worked towards meeting the conditions
required for the transition from OHR to EUSR following the PIC Steering Board
Political Directors’ decision in June 2006 that OHR should prepare to close in
June 2007. As I have emphasised throughout this report, however,
developments on both the regional and domestic scenes have been far from
propitious, ultimately causing the PIC to decide on 27 February to maintain
OHR. This means that OHR and EUSR will continue to work in tandem, but
with the latter assuming increased prominence as the more leisurely transition
process proceeds.
98. In the meantime the General Affairs and External Relations Council
had on 16-17 October welcomed the second joint report by SG/HR Javier Solana and
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on a reinforced EU Presence in BiH in the
context of the closure of the OHR. In accordance with my mandate, on 23
November I submitted a detailed proposal for the consideration of the Council on
the mandate, structure and resources required for a reinforced EU engagement in
BiH. Working groups in Brussels examined the issues involved and the
Council adopted a new joint action (legal basis) in January 2007. This
will now need to be reviewed.
XXI. Reporting Schedule
99. In keeping with my proposal to submit
regular reports for onward transmission to the Security Council, as required by
Security Council resolution 1031 (1995), I herewith present my second regular
report. Should the Secretary-General or any Security Council member
require information at any other time, I would be pleased to provide an
additional written update.
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