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January - June 2003
Mid -Year Report To The European Parliament
Summary
During the first half of 2003, the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
continued its efforts to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of
the 1995 Peace Agreement.
The OHR remained focused on its overall aim of setting Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH) irreversibly on the road to statehood within the European
Union (EU), and on preparing the ground for a phasing out of its own
mission within the coming years.
Towards this end, a “ Mission Implementation Plan” (MIP) for the OHR
was drawn up and endorsed by the Peace Implementation Council at the beginning
of the year. It has since then formed the basis for the OHR’s work in
BiH.
The MIP outlined six “Core Tasks” for OHR:
- Entrenching the rule of law
- Reforming the Economy
- Strengthening the capacity of BiH’s governing institutions,
especially at the State-level
- Establishing State-level civilian Command and Control over the
armed forces, reforming the security sector, and paving the way for integration into the Euro-Atlantic
framework
- Ensuring that extreme nationalists, war criminals, and their
organised criminal networks cannot reverse peace implementation
- Promoting the sustainable return of refugees and displaced
persons
During the reporting period, measurable progress was made on each of these
priorities.
To help entrench the Rule of Law, an Anti-Crime and Corruption Unit
(formerly called the Serious Crimes Unit) was set up within the OHR. The OHR,
working with the BIH authorities, also began the process of restructuring the
BiH court system at all levels. A new Legal Reform Unit within OHR, High
Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils for BIH, a Special Chamber in the BiH State
Court, and a Special Department in the BiH Prosecutor’s Office were established
and are now functioning.
Expert reform commissions were launched in other key reform priority
areas – comprised of local representatives but chaired in each case by a
respected international expert – covering Indirect Tax Policy, Defence and
Intelligence. A wholly locally staffed Commission was also set up to explore
possible ways to achieve the unification of Mostar. The Mostar
Commission made important progress, but fell short of success. A second
attempt under international community chairmanship will soon be launched.
In the area of public administration reform, a state-level Civil
Service Agency was created last May to help introduce more modern standards in
public administration. Entity Civil Service agencies are also being established.
On 7 March, the OHR launched a major attack on the networks which provide
funding and support for key ICTY indictees, including Radovan Karadzic. OHR
was also tasked by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board (PIC SB) with
establishing a system for the domestic prosecution of war crimes.
Proposals towards this end were being elaborated jointly with the ICTY.
The EU Police Mission launched on 1 January 2003, moved into full and
successful operational gear. It will play a vital role in supporting
the OHR and the international community’s overall priorities in promoting the
rule of law and fighting organised crime.
Continued implementation of property legislation, the increasing
visibility and self-confidence of return communities and, most importantly,
the numbers of people returning, remained encouraging and meant that the
OHR stayed on track for the completion of one of its key and most sensitive
task, resulting in the closure of the “Reconstruction and Return Task Force”
(RRTF) at the end of 2003. Adequate local and international funding
for refugee return, and international monitoring of the process, will continued
to be needed for some time after the draw-down of the RRTF.
The OHR’s media development mandate was largely completed and its
Media Development Department closed down. International support will
continue to be needed, however, to ensure the establishment of an independent
and economically viable Public Broadcasting System for BiH.
After a long process of government formation, coalition governments were
formed at State, Entity, and Cantonal levels during the early months of
2003.
During the reporting period, the High Representative reduced the use of
his executive powers by nearly one-third compared to the previous six
months, a trend that was expected to continue as part of the MIP process.
Almost half of his decisions were legislative impositions, which served to keep
reforms moving during the nearly 4 months when BiH had no functional government
following the October 2002 general elections.
*****
Political developments
The final months of 2002, and the early weeks of 2003 were dominated by
government formation. A new State-level Council of Ministers (CoM) led by
Prime Minister Terzic was formed in January. State-level Ministers
for Justice and Security were appointed for the first time, in accordance with
the Law on the Council of Ministers adopted in December 2002. The Federation and
Republika Srpska entity governments were in place by end-January and
mid-February respectively.
Prime Minister Terzic’s administration was hampered from the outset by the
constitutional dysfunctionality of the Council of Ministers (he does not appoint
and cannot remove Ministers – they owe their existence and loyalty to the
political parties, not to the Government) and by the lack of capacity and
support within the institution of the CoM as a whole. As the result, the output
of the Council of Ministers was low during the first six months of the year,
with limited legislative activity. The restructuring of the new ministries and
governing bodies also proceeded slowly.
The Entity and Cantonal governments faced similar problems in terms of slow
government formation and chronic capacity problems.
The continuing division of Mostar remained a serious problem during the
reporting period. Eight years after the war, the City of Mostar remained a
collection of municipalities without co-ordination and without the capacity to
promote the development of the City. A Commission comprised solely of local
representatives was established in Spring 2003 to explore options for a
permanent statute of the city, and to provide the citizens of Mostar with an
opportunity to contribute to the debate about the future of their City, without
interference from the international community. By the end of this reporting
period, however, this Commission had achieved only limited results. A second
commission on Mostar under international chairmanship is due to start its work
in the very near future.
In Republika Srpska, despite some initial posturing and rhetoric, the
government and parliament started slowly processing major reform policy
initiatives.
The revelation in March 2003, of major arms smuggling by an RS arms company
under government control, however, the so-called ORAO scandal, rocked the RS
political establishment and forced the resignation of Mirko Sarovic as a member
of the BIH Presidency on 4 April 2003.
The ORAO scandal, followed shortly afterwards by an SFOR investigation that
showed the RS armed forces had been spying on NATO and other international
actors, gave impetus to major defence and intelligence reform initiatives.
Commissions were established under international chairmanship but otherwise
composed entirely of BiH members. The Commissions were tasked to develop plans
to overhaul the entities’ defence and intelligence structures, and consider
possibilities for moving competencies to the state-level, with a view to
creating a single army and a single intelligence service for BiH (see also
below, under “Defence and Intelligence Reform.”)
OHR Developments - Mission Implementation Plan
(MIP)
Since the Office of the High Representative was created in 1995/1996, good
progress had been made. Nearly a million refugees and displaced persons had
returned home by the end of 2002. The physical infrastructure of the country had
been substantially repaired. Freedom of movement had been established. A stable
currency was in circulation across BiH. Macro-economic management had
significantly improved. Some specific tasks in which the OHR had invested a
great deal of time and effort over the years had been completed or handed over
to the local authorities. Others in which the OHR has taken a leading role, such
as refugee return, were on course to transfer to the BiH authorities by the end
of 2003. Other aspects of the OHR’s work were not yet ready to make that
transition – although the time had come to elaborate a plan for how to get to
this point in the shortest possible timeframe.
The OHR presented its “Mission Implementation Plan” to the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board on the 20th of December 2002.
The PIC Steering Board warmly welcomed and endorsed the Plan, which singled out
six core tasks for the OHR to concentrate on in order to accomplish its mission.
(The text of the MIP can be found on the OHR website at
http://www.ohr.int).
The six “Core Tasks” of the MIP were the following:
- Entrenching the rule of law
- Ensuring that extreme nationalists, war criminals, and their
organised criminal networks cannot reverse peace implementation
- Reforming the Economy
- Strengthening the capacity of BiH’s governing institutions,
especially at the State-level
- Establishing State-level civilian Command and Control over the
armed forces, reforming the security sector, and paving the way for integration into the Euro-Atlantic
framework
- Promoting the sustainable return of refugees and displaced
persons
Each task was divided into several sub-programmes, and specific OHR
Departments were assigned responsibility for defining and implementing
measurable steps toward each goal.
During the reporting period, the OHR
presented two updates on MIP implementation to the PIC SB, in April and June
2003. The content of these updates is reflected in the present report,
below. A formal report on and assessment of the first year of the
MIP was planned for the beginning of 2004. The MIP marked the beginning of
an OHR exit strategy that would also involve diminishing use of the High
Representative’s executive powers.
During the reporting period, the High Representative reduced the use of his
executive powers by nearly one-third compared to the previous six months, a
trend that was expected to continue as part of the MIP process. Almost half of
the High Representative’s decisions were legislative impositions, many of which
served to keep essential reforms on track during the four months following the
October 2002 general elections, before a government was formed.
The number of decisions was not the only sign that the High Representative
was intervening less directly in the BiH political process. The majority
of legislative and institution-building impositions were agreed with the
political parties in advance, (so-called “soft impositions”), and were therefore
not controversial. Exceptions included the decisions to crack down on the
support networks of ICTY-indictee Radovan Karadzic, which by their nature had to
be kept secret in order to have the intended effect.
Also of note was the increasing willingness of the various BiH parliaments to
adopt laws or amendments imposed by the High Representative. This willingness to
adopt impositions might be seen as a symptom of the tendency on the part of some
BiH politicians to accept reforms on the one hand, which at the same time
preferring to duck responsibility by forcing the High Representative to act on
their behalf. However, domestic adoption of High Representative
impositions – overwhelmingly by consensus of all parliamentary parties – did
illustrate the extent to which the political debate in BiH was moving forward:
previously untouchable issues for one or the other of the parties had now become
facts of life to which the parties were increasingly prepared to lend their
support.
Entrenching the Rule of Law
Towards the end of 2002, the OHR imposed a complete restructuring of the
court system within BiH, closing and consolidating courts throughout both
entities in order to achieve a more efficient and more accountable judicial
system. The number of first-instance courts was reduced from 78 to 47, subject
matter jurisdiction was harmonised and commercial departments are being created
in 15 first-instance courts. The OHR also helped introduce the necessary
framework to enable the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (HJPCs) to
announce judicial positions in the first- and second-instance courts in the
Entities.
By early January 2003, this restructuring was starting to be implemented.
On 16 January 2003, the HJPCs appointed eight members to the Criminal
Division of the State Court and a Chief Prosecutor and three assistants to the
Prosecutor’s Office of BiH.
On 24 January 2003, the Criminal Procedure Code of BiH was imposed, which
entered into force on 1 March 2003. This represented a significant step in
the process of reforming the criminal justice system of BiH. Together with the
Criminal Code, which entered into force on the same date, it renders the Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina operational.
On 27 January 2003, the newly appointed judges of the Court of BiH and
prosecutors of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH – the first such institutions
ever, at State-level – took their oaths of office in a widely welcomed ceremony.
On that same day, the Court of BiH held a ceremony to open its newly renovated
temporary facilities. Within weeks, the State Prosecutor’s office had already
brought charges against eight defendants for counterfeiting. Two of these
defendants entered pleas of guilty while the cases of the remaining defendants
were being set for trial. Shortly thereafter, the Prosecutor’s office
brought charges against other accused persons for human trafficking
In a complementary development, the OHR created a new unit called the Anti
Crime and Corruption Unit (ACCU) to help support local prosecution,
investigation and analysis efforts related to systemic organised crime and
corruption. The ACCU, in close co-operation with domestic agencies and
authorities, has undertaken efforts to guide and support investigations and
prosecution in multiple cases. At times, due to the political and technical
limitations of the local authorities, the ACCU has provided specialised support
capacities such as forensic audit work or specialised experts as court
witnesses. ACCU was also assisting in assessing which cases should be
transferred to the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH as part of the implementation of
the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code of BiH.
During early May, ACCU worked with EUPM, at the request of the Minister of
Interior of the Republika Srpska, to transfer a major organised crime case to
the Criminal Division of the Court of BiH and the Prosecutors Office of BiH.
This is a very serious case – the most significant human trafficking case in
BiH’s history – and the fact that it is being tackled within BiH's court system
is a significant step forward.
On 23 April 2003, OHR held a “crime summit,” which was attended by the
Ministries of Interior of both entities and the Ministry of Security of the
state, together with the State Border Service and State Investigation and
Protection Agency. The EUPM also participated in these meeting. The purpose of
the meeting was to address the impending end of the state of emergency in Serbia
following the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, and the possibility that
many persons apprehended in Serbia might flee to BiH upon their release in
Serbia.
The Head and Deputy Head of the Rule of Law Pillar visited Belgrade on 29 and
30 April 2003 to meet with officials from the Serbian Ministry of Justice,
Ministry of Interior and the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. The purpose of the
visit was to offer to facilitate the creation of operational protocols between
these ministries and offices and their counterparts in BiH, in order to
interdict criminal activities which transcend the borders of BiH and Serbia more
effectively. In addition, during the visit, the OHR officials exchanged
information with the Serbian officials as to specific suspected criminal
activities of interest to both BiH and Serbia and arranged for further exchanges
of information in regard to these activities. The Serbian officials were
eager to continue the exchange of such information.
Reforming the Economy
The EU/EC and the High Representative had insisted strongly that the BiH
authorities reform the revenue system by beginning the process of establishing
VAT at the State level and reforming the administration of customs. In February
2003, an “Indirect Tax Policy Commission” was established to assist in this
process. It was tasked to undertake a number of activities to promote a
single customs service for BiH and a single State-level VAT. Several
presentations were made during the reporting period to senior politicians,
technical experts and the general public to build understanding and support for
customs issues.
The main priority of the Indirect Tax Policy Commission was to produce an
interim law to establish an Indirect Tax Authority (ITA) by July 1. The
Law was ready in time, authorising the ITA and Governing Board to begin work on
the establishment a modern State-level system of indirect tax collection, and a
single, efficient customs service, both in accordance with European
standards. At the end of the reporting period, however, the Law was still
pending before government and waiting to go to parliament. Its successful
enactment into law, and the start of implementation, would mark a big step in
demonstrating BiH’s ability to take difficult decisions in this sensitive area,
to tackle fraud and corruption, and to move towards EU compatibility. This Law
would break new ground in two other areas. This would be the first time
that Article 3.5A of Dayton was used to pass competencies from the Entities to
the State and the first time administrative areas would be established which
conform to the natural economic regions of BiH, and not to the Inter-Entity
Boundary Line.
In December 2002, the so-called “Bulldozer Committee” presented the BiH
governments with a list of 50 “economic roadblocks” to business development and
investment, along with their respective legal solutions. Those proposed changes
were presented to the relevant authorities (State Council of Ministers, FBiH
Government and RS Government) during the first quarter of 2003. The businesses
or business associations that submitted the requests had an opportunity to
testify before the relevant parliamentary committees, and advocate directly for
the reforms. Local Implementation Committees, co-ordinated by local business
associations, were also set up in order to insure proper reform implementation
and follow-up. All 50 pieces of legislation were adopted, none imposed, by 4
June 2003, and the domestic authorities then assumed responsibility for the next
phase of the project, which will involve six regional committees.
Apart from its impact on the economic reform agenda, the “Bulldozer
Committee” and its successes represented an encouraging example of the
development, in the business sector as least, of a genuine civil society in
BiH.
Concrete progress was also made in a number of other areas such as
agriculture, telecommunications and public administration during the reporting
period. A State-level Veterinary Law was finally passed but implementation was
delayed by the slow appointment of the new director for the State Veterinary
Office. The new director was only named in May 2003. His initial tasks
will include getting an animal identification project underway, adapting local
regulations to EU standards, and securing sustainable financing over the next 5
years. Progress was made in the telecommunications sector by enacting the Law on
Communications as part of the economic package. This enabled regulators to begin
implementing a regulatory regime conducive to competition.
Audits carried out in the telecommunications sector illustrated the dire need
for reform. Audits of the RS- and Mostar-based energy companies, Elektroprivreda
RS and Elektroprivreda Herceg-Bosna, revealed fraud and mismanagement to the
tune of hundreds of million of KM, involving senior figures in the main Bosnian
Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist parties. The audit report for the
Sarajevo-based “Elektroprivreda BiH” produced similar findings, albeit on a
smaller financial scale, and raised uncomfortable questions for the SDA.
Strengthening the capacity of BiH’s governing institutions,
especially at the State-level
On 23 January, the Head of the Civil Service Agency (who was appointed by the
previous High Representative) reported to the Chair of the Council of Ministers
that the Agency was now fully operational. This Agency is key to
preventing party patronage at State level, as it is responsible for the
recruitment of civil servants. The RS was working on setting-up a similar
Agency with international financial and technical support. The Federation
was less enthusiastic, forcing the OHR to assume a more proactive role in
facilitating the drafting of its civil service legislation, but the legislation
was eventually adopted in May 2003.
The BiH authorities presented new plans for comprehensive public
administration reform (PAR) to the PIC Steering Board on 28 March. The PIC
Steering Board welcomed and endorsed the authorities’ targets, while cautioning
that implementation would be of essence.
To assist with implementation, a PAR Task Force was created made up of the
State- and entity-level ministers responsible for public-administration reform,
the Mayors of Brcko, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, the heads of the Civil Service
Agencies, BiH experts (such as auditors), and members of the International
Community, including the European Commission.
The Task Force will work according to five core objectives:
- Public administration needs to become cost-effective
and efficient, and downsize where appropriate;
- It has to be able to manage public funds, taxpayers’
money, reliably and efficiently;
- It has to be run by professionals, not
political-party appointees, at all levels of Government;
- Funds available to the administration have to be used
transparently and in accordance with EU best practice;
- The administration has to serve citizens, not politicians.
The aim was to arrive at a comprehensive PAR strategy by autumn 2004.
Defence And Intelligence Reform
The unfolding of the ORAO scandal starting in March, over illicit arm sales
by the RS to Iraq in violation of UN sanctions, became the catalyst for
extensive defence reforms. It also forced the resignation of Mirko Sarovic as a
member of the BiH Presidency on 4 April 2003, and gave new impetus to calls for
greater political accountability in BiH.
On 2 April 2003, OHR issued several defence-related Decisions to help address
the systemic weaknesses exposed by the ORAO scandal. They included amendments to
the Entity Defence laws and constitutions in order to ensure that a similar
situation would not arise again.
On 9 May 2003 the High Representative took one step further and established a
“Defence Reform Commission,” chaired by former US Assistant Secretary for
Defence James Locher, and tasked with proposing fundamental changes to the
Command and Control of the Armed Forces in BiH. In addition to
correcting problems exposed by the ORAO scandal, it will also consider how to
overhaul the BiH Armed Forces and bring BiH closer to eventual NATO Partnership
for Peace membership. The Commission is expected to complete its work by
mid-September 2003.
Other significant developments in the defence area included an agreement on
Terms of Reference for the Secretary General of the Standing Committee on
Military Matters (SCMM), and his inclusion in the BiH Council of Ministers,
although not yet as a full member with voting rights. On a more practical level
the SCMM’s Secretariat started to expand (from 9 to around 88 personnel) during
the reporting period, allowing it Secretariat to begin operating as a fledgling
‘ministry.’
Following on the heels of the ORAO scandal, SFOR revelations that the RS
intelligence service had been spying on the International Community,
neighbouring countries and even the Federation gave rise to another major reform
initiative. An Expert Commission on Intelligence Reform (ECIR) headed by a
former senior Hungarian intelligence official, was launched at the end of May
2003. The Commission was tasked to produce a proposal for a single intelligence
structure for BiH. It was due to produce the necessary legislative changes
and other legal instruments, in line with democratic principles and practice
elsewhere in Europe, in autumn 2003.
Ensuring that extreme nationalists, war criminals, and their
organised criminal networks cannot reverse peace
implementation
On 7 March, the OHR, the United States and SFOR struck at the financial,
logistical and security support networks that have allowed Radovan Karadzic to
evade arrest for 7 years.
The OHR kicked off the operations by enacting amendments to relevant laws,
which would allow banking agencies to block assets and prohibit future
transactions of individuals and companies that obstruct the Dayton/Paris Peace
Agreement. The High Representative then proceeded to use these new amendments to
place “Blocking Orders” against two individuals, Momcilo Mandic and Milovan
Bijelica, and two companies, Manco Oil and Privredna Bank Srpsko Sarajevo.
From then on, all bank accounts in their names were frozen and transferred to
the Central Bank.
Mandic was known as Karadzic’s chief financier. His association went back to
the early 1980s when he allegedly helped Karadzic avoid justice in an earlier
corruption scandal. He was also a well-known war profiteer.
Bjelica was also a key player in the shadowy invisible structure behind
Karadzic’s security operation. He served as Karadzic’s go-between, his
messenger with the outside world. He was also known to have links to arms
dealing, extortion, and various other smuggling activities. In addition to
imposing a Blocking Order on him, the High Representative/EUSR also removed him
from his position as the Chairman of the Srpsko Sarajevo Municipal Assembly.
The United States acted in parallel to block the above-mentioned individuals’
and companies’ assets held in the United States, invoking its Presidential
Decree of 27 June 2001.
SFOR launched an all-day support operation, involving raids on RS armed
forces offices and related facilities in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Pale, and
Lukavica. Documents, computer hard drives, floppy discs etc., were
confiscated. Analysis was still ongoing at the end of the reporting
period.
On the 16th of April 2003, the EU Council added its support to the
OHR’s and the IC’s efforts by putting in place a visa-ban against a number of
individuals suspected of obstructing the ICTY in its mandate and providing
material support to PIFWCS (2003/280/CFSP). The list of individuals was due to
be expanded in July 2003.
During the first half of 2003 the plan for domestic trial of war crimes in a
special panel of the Court of BiH was subject of discussion between OHR, ICTY,
the Ministeries of Justice as well as the Prosecutors of both entities and
state. In addition both the OSCE and the Council of Europe were invited to offer
their views on the proposals under discussion. The recommendations resulting
from the consultations with these groups and ICTY were presented to the Peace
Implementation Council Steering Board (PIC SB) on 12 June 2003. The PIC SB
decided that a War Crimes Chamber within the Court of BiH and a War Crimes
Department within the State Prosecutor’s Office had to be established. The OHR
was tasked to co-ordinate the implementation of the project in co-ooperation
with the BiH authorities and the relevant international organisations.
Promoting the sustainable return of refugees and displaced
persons
The number of refugees returning continued to be high, exceeding 102.000 in
2002. According to UNHCR statistics, the total of registered returns to and
within BiH has risen to nearly 1 million people, including 390.000 so-called
minority returns. In the reporting period the State Ministry for Human
Rights and Refugees, together with the relevant entity ministries, continued to
assume a greater leadership role in the return process and moved closer towards
ownership of the remaining process. The January 2003 endorsement by the Peace
Implementation Council of the Annex VII strategy, which was drawn up by the BiH
authorities, UNHCR and the OHR, further underlined this trend. Beyond
recognizing the need to facilitate as many as 500,000 additional returns in BiH
under domestic leadership over the next four years, the Strategy provides a
roadmap to build additional capacity within domestic institutions to take on
these tasks as International Organizations scale down their operations,
recalibrate resources to address other priorities, and in some cases, phase out
completely. The Strategy calls for the Reconstruction and Return Task Force
(RRTF) to draw down by the end of 2003.
Property Law Implementation (PLIP) made decisive progress during the
reporting period. The countrywide repossession rate of 67% promises nearly
full implementation by the end of this year. A source of concern is the large
urban centres such Sarajevo and Banja Luka however, as they lag well behind the
Entity averages. As approximately 40.000 claims remain unimplemented in both
Entities, the focus now is to ensure adequate budgeting for alternative
accommodation. In addition, the domestic authorities, with the assistance of the
international community, will introduce a package of minor amendments to the
property laws to ensure adherence to the principles of transparency and rule of
law embodied in the New Strategic Direction for Property Law Implementation. As
partners, the international and domestic institutions will also work to ensure a
smooth transfer of CRPC.
However the success of the PLIP raises increasing concerns about
discrepencies in the property laws across the region. This needs to be addressed
throughout the former Yugoslavia. There remains some 21.000 Croatian Serbs who
occupy the homes of others and who still seek to either repossess their homes in
the Republic of Croatia and/or return. Increasingly, these families face
eviction under BiH’s laws without their own long-term housing solutions because
the recent amendments to the property laws in Croatia have not gone far enough
and have yielded few real results. Similarly, pre-war residents of other
neighboring countries in the region (Slovenia) have approached the OHR with
concerns about their own eviction and their inability to repossess property and
return to their own prewar homes in the region. Solutions within Croatia and
other former Yugoslav states must be identified for these individuals.
As returnees attempt to reintegrate into society, combined domestic and
international efforts must ensure that their return is sustainable. The legal
framework necessary to ensure returnees' unbiased access to socio-economic
facilities and opportunities is largely in place, but information on and
enforcement of the applicable laws and agreements remains limited. To
increase returnees' awareness of their rights, the OHR has developed a number of
public information campaigns that provide information on access to employment
opportunities, education, health, and utilities.
Although the OHR is on track for the draw down of RRTF, and the handover of
responsibility to local authorities at the end of 2003, there are still major
tasks ahead. Draft legislative amendments have been agreed on some items, but
must still be presented to the BiH parliaments. Discussion still continues on
two important institutional aspects: the Return Fund and the prospective BIH
institution which should review CRPC claims.
The fact that at a time when refugees and Displaced Persons are returning in
large numbers, international financial assistance is rapidly decreasing, is a
concern – especially when domestic funds remain insufficient to cover needs.
BiH in the Region
Nervousness persisted in BiH about regional developments, notably the Kosovo
status question and repeated unhelpful statements during the reporting period
from Serbian political leaders. Swift responses from HR Solana and
Commissioner Patten helped calm things, and the new FRY-BiH border agreement
expected during the second half of 2003, should be important as well. It
remained absolutely vital that the EU continued to de-link BiH from the Kosovo
final status question and from Serbia and Montenegro’s constitutional
developments.
The 12 March 2003 murder of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was a
terrible blow to the region. The best tribute to Zoran Djindjic’s memory
would be to continue the work in which he was engaged to secure progress and
stability in the region, and its integration into mainstream Europe, and in so
doing to demonstrate that attacks such as this cannot defeat democracy.
Increased co-operation between BiH and its neighbours in the fight against
criminal networks was an immediate consequence of the Djindjic assassination.
A significant step was reached between BiH and Croatia when Croatia managed,
in January 2003, to ratify the provisionally applied Agreement on the
determination of border crossings of 6 April 2001. In parallel, the newly
constituted BiH Presidency and President Mesic initiated a draft Agreement on
local border zone regimes, as well as three annexes to the Co-location Treaty of
17 June 2002. These documents are now waiting to be signed by both foreign
ministers.
BiH and European rapprochement process
On 1 January 2003, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) began operations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It followed on from the UN International
Police Task Force (IPTF) operation and is intended to build on and secure the
IPTF’s successes in police reform. The EUPM is the European Union’s first crisis
management operation under the European Security and Defence Policy. The Mission
consists of 500 police officers and 50 civilian experts from 33 states, led by
Police Commissioner Sven Frederiksen, under the overall supervision of Lord
Ashdown as Special Representative of the European Union.
From the outset, the EUSR/High Representative made clear his intention to
implement requests by the EUPM Commissioner to remove from office, in extreme
cases, non compliant police officers, as well as his commitment to apply
political pressure as needed on domestic authorities to assist EUPM in the
performance of its mandate. The deterrent power of removals had, at the time of
writing this report, sufficed to ensure local police compliance with EUPM
recommendations.
The first half of 2003 marked important steps forward in BiH’s process
towards eventual EU integration. In April, the European Commission
launched a Feasibility Study on BiH, within the Stabilisation and Association
process, to assess the country’s readiness to undertake negotiations on a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The result was expected toward the end
of 2003. The June Thessalonica Summit also helped give practical
expression to the Feira European Council statement that BiH, like its
neighbours, was a potential candidate for future EU membership. It provided for
the extension and adaptation to the Western Balkan of some of the instruments,
which have proved so effective in the central and southern European candidate
countries.
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