Remarks by the High Representative, Ambassador Carlos Westendorp to the General Affairs Council of European Union


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	Remarks by the High Representative, Ambassador Carlos Westendorp to the General Affairs Council of European Union
	\| 26/4/1999





	Grateful for this chance to brief you on how things stand, as seen from Bosnia. Thus far, the answer is pretty encouraging. In the run up to the latest events in Kosovo and the Brcko award, we had been making good, steady progress in Bosnia. We had scored a number of successes, although we had also run into obstacles, which is to be expected in such a situation. Highlights of the recent months: implementation of the general and cantonal elections of 21/13 September, Madrid PIC, agreement on special relations between the Federation and Croatia With the air-strikes against the FRY, Bosnia has entered a more difficult period again, in which the momentum of recent months may be somewhat slowed. But I hope that, to the maximum extent possible, we will be able to maintain "business as usual". Some predicted air strikes would lead to political melt-down in the RS; that the situation would rapidly become unmanageable. That has not happened. In fact the most remarkable thing has been the dignified restraint displayed by people in the RS to what, for them, is plainly an extraordinarily difficult situation. I take it as a good sign - a sign that attitudes are changing. That people have had enough of war, and that they are certainly unwilling to be used in another of Milosevic's grand but ultimately disastrous schemes. Because they recognise that their future lies as part of BiH. This is a vital point to keep in mind in the coming weeks and months. The events in Kosovo do not argue, as some are claiming, that we should abandon Dayton. Recent events certainly do not argue for swapping the RS for Kosovo or any such option. I don't want to sound complacent. There are of course some hard-line thugs, for the most part associates of the former President Nikola Poplasen, who are doing their best to stir trouble. There has been some violence, and some damage to Embassy offices in Banja Luka. There may be further surprises in store. As we well know, surprise is one of Milosevic's tactics, and he will make further attempts to stir up trouble. But thus far, the story has been how reluctant the masses appear to be to join in. I regard my contribution as being to keep Bosnia of the political radar screen. I think that that is most helpful to Nato - and it is also the best thing for BiH to try and be under the circumstances. To that end we have been trying to emphasise that BiH is separate from the conflict across the border; that BiH has a hard-won peace which it is in no one's interests to disrupt. We have tried, in so far as possible, publicly to desegregate SFOR from the rest of the Nato action. We are in continual touch with the RS leaders - Radisic, Dodik, Djokic, Plavsic, hand-holding and providing 'TLC' (tender-loving-care). And we are keeping an eye on Poplasen, who continues to be an irritant, but not on a catastrophic scale. I was convinced at the time that removing him from office was the right thing to do; I am even more sure after the events of the last month. We would be having a more difficult time if Poplasen was still the President today. If he wants to carry on turning up at the office every day and issuing ludicrous press releases claiming that two thirds of the world back him, it's not a big deal for me. He is not carrying serious political weight. If he takes or plans more dramatic action, then I will not hesitate to take more dramatic action myself against him and his party; but I suspect that is what he wants, so I will aim to avoid doing so unless absolutely necessary. In the meantime, the most sensible thing to do is to try to maintain, as much as possible, business as usual. Radisic, after a 6 week boycott of the common institutions following the Brcko arbitration award, was induced by me last week to return to them. I called a meeting of the Presidency, which he attended. And on Thursday we had a very constructive meeting of the Council of Ministers, again for the first time for 6 weeks, which the Serb members attended. Our office has remained open in Banja Luka - and apart from 2 smashed windows, largely unscathed thus far, touch wood. On the political front, I have judged it best to try to keep a freeze on the efforts to form a government in the RS. So Dodik continues as caretaker PM; he performs an extraordinarily difficult job with commendable political courage and Herculean staying power. There is, however, to be a meeting of the RSNA tomorrow. In the Federation, the murder in Sarajevo of the B Croat Deputy Interior Minister last month has greatly heightened tensions between the Bosniac and the Croats. The Croats feel more isolated and vulnerable than ever - although the demands for a 3rd Entity appear to have died down somewhat. The Federation Parliament recently approved the special relations agreement between Croatia and the Federation, which will, I hope, eventually go some way to reducing tensions. But I am concerned about the future of the Federation. It is going to require our full attention in the months to come. No SFOR army should be taken out from BiH to go to Kosovo. These are different issues. There should be a global solution for the Balkans, we cannot go Republic by Republic trying to solve the problems independently. Refugees issue of Kosovo is the most urgent problem. Good idea to send ground troops to help them. Situation RS freeze. But moderates based in democratic principles and not ultra-nationalist will have the future of the RS and BiH. Finally, let me make two points. First, while I stress in public how we are working to isolate Bosnia from events across the Drina, we all know in reality that the future of Bosnia, like the future of the whole region, now depends on the outcome of the struggle in Kosovo. I am more convinced than ever that there will be no lasting peace bin BiH until Milosevic is gone, indeed until there is democracy in Belgrade and for that matter, real democracy in Zagreb too. What we need are new leaders and structures capable of defending the interest of all the citizens - minorities and majorities, Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats alike. Because there can be no future for BiH as a state without Serbs and Croats playing their full part alongside Bosniacs in the running of that state. The key to the future lies in entrenching more democracy at every level as the best protection for the weak against the strong. It is not possible to respect the minorities without respect to the majorities. So we have absolutely to prevail in this struggle. Otherwise the peaceful future of Bosnia will number among the many casualties. Another of the many reasons why the only exit strategy is victory. Secondly, when we have won, we will need a strategy for rebuilding Kosovo that learns from the lessons of civilian implementation in Bosnia, and a strategy for the whole region that matches the scale of the challenge. The European Council of Vienna has invited the Council to work on a common strategy for the Balkans. The Amsterdam Treaty will soon become into force. You have the political will, you also have the instruments. You should go ahead. The EU should aim to play the central role in such a strategy - but only if it is willing to offer the vision, the leadership and the immense resources that the scale of the enterprise demands. That strategy must be open and outward-looking, inclusive not exclusive. Regarding Bosnia, this strategy should include an intensification of the dialogue in political and economic matters between the Council of the EU and the European Commission and the BiH authorities in order to ensure the closest involvement of the EU in civilian implementation of Dayton agreement. It will need to continue to find the resources needed for Bosnia in addition to Kosovo - scaling back our assistance to Bosnia prematurely will only invite greater expense when things go wrong. The European institutions bear a heavy responsibility here - not just to provide the hard cash, but to show that they are capable of displaying the imagination and generosity of spirit that the hour demands. I'm sure it will definitively contribute to stability and democracy in BiH and to bring BiH to European standards. It is true of the EU; and it is true also of the Council of Europe, which I will be urging tomorrow to admit Bosnia as a full member at an early opportunity. We need such a strategy. I hope and trust that we have it.