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It is three months since the fall of the Saddam
regime, and every day brings fresh evidence of the enormous difficulties
involved in building peace.
The international community is not new to ‘nation-building’.
In Bosnia, we have been at it for a long time. It is nearly eight years since
the guns fell silent. But we are still very heavily engaged – slowly, steadily
helping the democratically elected authorities repair the damage wrought by the
war.
Bosnia in 2003 is almost unrecognisable to the country that emerged from the
horror of war. Come to Sarajevo today, and you will find a bustling city, with
supermarkets and DIY stores. Nearly a million refugees have returned to
their homes. Bosnia has one of the most stable currencies in the Balkans.
Freedom of movement is now taken for granted, following the imposition by one of
my predecessors of a car license plate system guaranteeing ethnic anonymity – a
change opposed by many of the politicians in power at the time, but widely
applauded by the public.
So, out of the gaze of the world’s media, things have been getting
better.
What should all this mean for the role of the international community here,
nearly a decade since the war? Is it time for us to scale back our involvement,
and, in particular, to relinquish some of the powers that we exercise?
These are fair questions. One of the biggest conundrums facing any
international mission is how to drive forward peace implementation as rapidly as
possible, but in a way that lasts, and without retarding local democratic
development. We face these problems in Bosnia today; and no doubt we will face
them in Iraq tomorrow.
Every situation is different, of course. Today, Bosnia is setting its
sights on membership of the European Union and NATO. So, there are those
who argue that Bosnia’s problems now look increasingly like those of
transitional countries, Poland or Hungary for example, and that Bosnia should be
left to handle them itself. They compare the international community’s powers in
Bosnia to those of a dictator or a colonial governor, and argue that they have
no place in a modern, democratic Europe.
As a Liberal politician, I understand those arguments. Bosnia is in
much better condition than it was eight years ago. But dangers
remain. Ask Bosnians if they want the international community to leave and
the vast majority say not yet. This country still suffers from a
dysfunctional political system, weak institutions and the enduring threat of
crime and corruption. These problems are being tackled, but they are not
yet beaten. The job is nearing completion, but it is not yet done.
To scale back our involvement too quickly, before peace has been fully secured,
would, frankly, be to gamble with this country’s – and this region’s –
future.
The international community is rightly blamed for failing to act decisively
to end the war here. But it has earned grudging respect for demonstrating
greater resolve in implementing the peace, and for the resources it has devoted
– and is continuing to devote – to the task.
None of which means that there should not be a proper debate about the powers
of the international community in Bosnia, or about how the transition from
powerful international oversight to genuine local self-government should be
carried out.
It is true that the High Representative in Bosnia has the power to impose or
revoke laws and to remove obstructionist politicians. But it is not true
that he is not accountable for this. The High Representative’s authority
comes from the Peace Implementation Council – made up of the 50 countries
responsible for overseeing the Dayton Peace Agreement, including Bosnia and
Herzegovina itself. His decisions are subject to international oversight, and to
the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court of BiH and, ultimately, Bosnia being a
member of the Council of Europe, of the European Court of Human Rights itself.
But ultimately, the strongest check and balance of all is the people of Bosnia,
on whose consent international authority ultimately depends. Opinion polls
consistently show that Bosnians support these powers and think they are used not
too much, but if anything too little.
That is not to say that our presence here should be prolonged any longer than
is necessary. My job is to get rid of my job. Which is why when I
arrived just over a year ago, I drew up a Mission Implementation Plan, setting
out the tasks that need to be completed before we can safely give up the
intrusive executive powers vested in my office, and transition into a more
normal, European Mission, supporting Bosnia on the next stage of her journey
towards EU membership. We are already paving the way for that transition.
Our numbers are dropping and so is our budget. We have launched an
aggressive programme to get Bosnians into key positions within the Mission.
Furthermore, my office is increasingly using its powers under Dayton not to
impose legislation, but to help the local authorities reach agreement. For
instance, we have established policy Commissions, made up almost entirely of
local politicians and experts, to reform Bosnia’s fragmented tax system,
military structures and intelligence sector. The legislation drafted in
these Commissions – stamped ‘Made In Bosnia’ – has already started to go through
Bosnia’s parliaments. By contrast, the number of pieces of legislation
that have been imposed, and the number of officials removed from office, has
dropped significantly in recent months, a trend I am determined should
continue.
The fact that we are now approaching the day when the international community
can relinquish its powers in Bosnia bears testimony to how far we have come in
recent years. But, that progress has only been possible because we have
had the power to clear problems and open up solutions. Our task now is to
work, with our friends in Bosnia, to finish those tasks that must be completed
to secure peace, and to set this country on the road to Europe as a fully
independent, modern democracy.
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